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AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CENTRALITY OF COMPETING                 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISES 
Tae Jun Bae 
June 1, 2015 
Social enterprises have recently been recognized as organizations located in the 
field where two competing institutional logics co-exist preeminently. My dissertation 
attempts to examine the conditions under which the centrality of competing institutional 
logics, referring to the degree to which two competing institutional logics are both 
important to organizational functioning, is higher or lower in social enterprises. Using 
hand-collected data from the survey of 190 social enterprises in South Korea, this 
dissertation not only presents a validated and reliable measure for the centrality of 
competing logics, but also identifies the factors associated with variation in a social 
enterprise’s centrality of competing logics. 
Building on the perspective of heterogeneity in intra-stakeholder group, the Study 
1 reveals that the heterogeneity within stakeholders can play a role in shaping the degree 
of centrality of competing logics. Specifically, ethical investors within investor 
stakeholders and cross-workers within employee stakeholder may enhance the centrality 
of competing logics.  
Drawing on imprinting perspective, Study 2 shows that there is the curvilinear 




Social entrepreneurs’ non-profit experience has a positive influence on the centrality of 
competing logics until reaching a certain point, beyond which that point is likely to be 
negative. Moreover, the effect of social entrepreneurs’ non-profit experience on the 
centrality of competing logics is less profound in the social enterprises with a highly 
ambivalent founder.  
This dissertation contributes to connect distinct research areas together, which are: 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Social entrepreneurship refers to leveraging economic activities to pursue social 
objectives (Dees, Emerson, & Econmy, 2004; Guclu, Anderson & Deeds, 2002; Fowler, 
2000; Mair & Marti, 2006; Van de Ven, Sapienza, & Villanueva, 2007; Zahra, 
Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009). In doing so, social entrepreneurial 
organizations attempt to embrace potentially conflicting goals (Austin, Stevenson, & 
Wei-Skillern, 2006; Mair & Marti, 2006; Miller, Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus 2012; 
Pache & Santos, 2013). Institutional theorists have described these dual imperatives as 
facing competing institutional logics, which are defined as conflicting macro-level belief 
systems and rules that guide organizational decision-making (Pache & Santos, 2013; 
Greenwood et al., 2011). 
 These logics are [1] a social welfare logic, which is a taken-for-granted norm that 
leads an organization to improve social conditions and care for beneficiaries, such as a 
neglected class of people, and [2] a commercial logic, which is a value that guides an 
organization to pursue economic profit and maximize revenue (Pache & Chrowdhury, 
2012; Pache & Santos, 2013). These two logics sometimes require trade-offs with each 
other and may be actually quite incompatible (Smith, Gonin, & Besharov, 2013). At other 
times, social enterprises are hybrids, which incorporate both competing institutional 
logics under a single organizational roof (Defourny & Nyssens, 2006; Doherty, Haugh, & 




Institutional theorists have assumed that the incorporation of both competing 
logics within a single organization ideally would provide benefits. Accordingly, if social 
enterprises as hybrid organizations, could incorporate competing institutional logics in a 
sustainable way; they would be more likely to [1] receive social and material support 
from those backing each of them (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2013), [2] gain 
legitimacy from external referents, such as resource holders attached to distinct logics 
(Greenwood et al., 2011), [3] create novel practices and tacit knowledge (Murray, 2010; 
Stark, 2009), and [4] generate reflexivity, which is the capacity to make self-referential 
actions (Seo & Creed, 2002). Other scholars, however, have cast doubt on the presumed 
benefits of accommodating both competing institutional logics. Integrating long-term 
competing institutional logics in a single organizational form entails contradictions, and 
possible negative outcomes, such as [1] a “sense of dissonance” (Stark, 2009), [2] 
“conflicting demands” (Glynn, 2000), and [3] “internal confusion” (Ashforth et al., 2009). 
Building on concerns about conflict, scholars have argued that a social enterprise’s dual 
commitment to both competing institutional logics could also create internal tensions, 
such as [1] measurement problems, [2] identity issues, [3] structuring concerns, and [4] 
conflicts between short- and long-term goals (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Consequently, a 
social enterprise could be incentivized to evade these problems by only supporting either 
a social-welfare logic or a commercial logic (Smith, Besharov, Wesseles, & Chertok, 
2012).  
The inconsistent and at times unpredictable consequences of incorporating 
competing institutional logics helped scholars to recognize centrality as a new dimension 




competing logics refers to the degree to which two competing institutional logics are both 
important to organizational functioning. If a social enterprise commits to a social mission 
while pursuing effective operations to generate an economic surplus (Mair, Battilana, & 
Cardenas, 2012), the centrality would be high. On the other hand, if a social enterprise 
loses sight of its social mission, due to placing too much emphasis on financial gain, or if 
a social enterprise were to focus exclusively on its social mission without considering 
commercial activities, the centrality would be low.  
Understanding the centrality of competing institutional logics is particularly 
important for social entrepreneurship. First, it could advance our understanding of 
organizational variety within the social entrepreneurship context. Social entrepreneurship 
has been viewed as a normative field, which was concerned with the notion that a social 
welfare logic and a commercial logic should be relatively equally emphasized in order for 
a social venture to prosper with each of these missions (Austin et al., 2006). However, 
there are growing bodies of observations that reveal social enterprises attend to social 
welfare and commercial logic in a hierarchy of prominence inside organizations (Pache & 
Santos, 2010; 2013). It illustrates that the relative importance of social welfare logic and 
commercial logic could vary according to individual social enterprises’ priorities. In other 
words, unlikely to conventional normative perspective, social enterprises have exhibited 
varying degree of the centrality of competing institutional logics. 
Second, investigation of the centrality of competing institutional logics could help 
uncover the condition under which some social enterprises pay much more attention to 
either a commercial logic or a social welfare logic, while other social enterprises try not 




emphasized on the achievement of high level of the centrality of competing logics (Mair, 
Battilana, & Cardenas, 2012). It has been believed that prioritization of either a 
commercial logic or a social welfare logic, which is the low level of centrality of 
competing logics, may threaten the legitimacy of social enterprises. Consequently, the 
researcher has paid scant attention to the phenomenon of varying degrees of the centrality 
of competing institutional logics within social entrepreneurship field. Although the 
prioritization of either a commercial logic or a social welfare logic could be regarded as 
the variation in the centrality of competing logics, relatively few studies have been 
devoted to detailed examination of the sources of variation in the centrality of competing 
logics in social enterprises. 
Despite its potential contributions to social entrepreneurship, research on 
centrality is still at an early stage. It is noteworthy that we have little known research to 
develop and validate a measurement instrument for a social enterprise’s centrality of 
competing logics. The absence of an existing reliable measure of a social enterprise’s 
centrality of competing logics have constrained social entrepreneurship studies from 
understanding the centrality within the context of social enterprises. Hence, by placing 
the centrality of competing institutional logics by social enterprises in the foreground, my 
dissertation attempts to operationalize the measure for a social enterprise’s centrality of 
competing logics. It not only propose the relevant measure of the centrality of competing 
logics, but it also validate and test the measure empirically with data collected from the 
certificated social enterprises in South Korea. Furthermore, it identifies the antecedents to 
the conditions under which the centrality of both a social welfare logic and a commercial 




review prior research on competing institutional logics, social enterprises’ centrality of 
competing logics, stakeholder theory, and imprinting as a perspective. 
Background and Literature Review 
Social entrepreneurship as a field with permanent competing institutional 
logics. Although there are several important theoretical and empirical issues regarding the 
identification of social enterprises, primarily because the meaning of social 
entrepreneurship varies across people, time frames, and countries (Teasdale, 2012), social 
entrepreneurship has its roots basically in both the field of entrepreneurship (for-profit) 
and public (non-profit) organization (Miller & Wesley, 2010). More specifically, there 
are at least four ways to define social entrepreneurship (Hoogendoorn, Pennings, & 
Thurik, 2009): (1) the innovation school, (2) the social enterprise school, (3) the 
Emergence of Social Enterprise in Europe (EMES) approach, and (4) the United 
Kingdom (UK) approach. Of these four perspectives on social enterprises, the first two 
come from an American tradition; whereas, the latter two are based on European tradition. 
The identification of social enterprises varies across the four different schools of thought. 
For example, from the social enterprise school, a social enterprise is a non-profit 
organization with earned-income activities. On the other hand, the innovation school and 
the UK approach suggest that social enterprises can acquire either a nonprofit legal status 
or a for-profit status (Dees & Anderson, 2006).  
Regardless of the definition of social entrepreneurship, however, there is general 
agreement that social entrepreneurial organizations engage in both socially and 
financially motivated activities (Dart, 2004). That is, social enterprises lie somewhere 




oriented” (Alter, 2004; Dees, Emerson, & Economy, 2002). This mixture of motives can 
be also described as having a “double bottom line” (Emerson & Twersky, 1996). This 
tendency is also apparent in the following motto: “We don’t hire homies to bake bread; 
we bake bread to hire homies,” which is from Homeboy bakery, first launched by 
Homeboy Industries in 1992. This business not only helps former gang members, but also 
competes with traditional for-profit firms. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that 
mottos like this one could be used by other social entrepreneurial organizations that 
combine both a social mission and a profit motive.   
Therefore, institutional scholars have described social entrepreneurial 
organizations as examples of organizations embedded within a field where long-term 
competing logics exist (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Doherty, Haugh, & Lyon, 2014; Jay, 
2013; Pache & Santos, 2013). Institutional logics refer to “[t]he socially constructed, 
historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, 
and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton, 2004: 69). An institutional logics 
perspective can also be understood as broader cultural beliefs and rules that guide 
decision-making (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2008: 350). Some fields utilize 
two or more competing institutional logics. As examples, within American medical 
schools, there is a continuous contest between a science and a care logic (Dunn & Jones, 
2010). Also, mutual funds exhibit both a trustee logic and a performance logic 
(Lounsbury, 2007). In addition, among higher education publishers there are two types of 




As Pache and Santos (2013) described, social enterprises permanently operate 
using two competing institutional logics:  a social welfare logic, which guided their 
activities to interact with public social services and a commercial logic, which led them 
to rely on commercial customers and industrial partners in order to survive. Thus, many 
social enterprises maintain dual commitments to focusing on profit-seeking activities, as 
well as on commercial activities in order to achieve their social mission. In other words, 
social enterprises respond simultaneously to both a social welfare logic and a commercial 
logic. 
Scholars have advised, seemingly without foundation so far, that both logics 
should be at the core of the operations and functioning of social enterprises. According to 
them, ideally social enterprises will be similarly committed both to their social mission 
and to their economic goals (Mair, Battilana, & Cardenas, 2012). The dominance of 
either a social welfare logic or a commercial logic could threaten the legitimacy as well 
as the survival of social enterprises. For example, if a social enterprise utilized a social 
welfare logic, it might be criticized for “playing” at business (Chapman, Forbes, & 
Brown, 2007), or for “philanthropic amateurism,” defined as voluntary organizations 
relying too much on unqualified amateurs (e.g. volunteers) (Anheier, 2005; Murray & 
Dollery, 2005; Salamon, 1987). The excessive dominance of a social welfare logic could 
jeopardize the survival of a social enterprise. On the other hand, when a commercial logic 
is given priority over a social logic, it is often criticized for succumbing to “mission-drift,” 
defined as a diversion of energy and effort away from a social mission (Jones, 2007:30; 
Mair, Battilana, & Cardenas, 2012; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Weisbrod, 2004). 




profit firms, not social enterprises (Yunus, 2011). Consequently, many scholars have 
assumed that a social enterprise can best accomplish its mission and economic 
performance when its social welfare logic and a commercial logic contribute equally 
(Greenwood et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2012). 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the efforts of incorporating competing 
logics equally are often strongly associated with internal and external conflicts. Simple 
blending long-term competing logics inside the organization can generate paradoxes of 
performing – ambiguous definition of success and failure (Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
Battilana and Dorado’s (2012) case study illustrates the negative effect of internal 
tensions on the growth of a social enterprise, which can occur when an organization 
thoughtlessly incorporates competing institutional logics. Lee (2014) also opined that the 
incorporation of competing institutional logics exposed social enterprises to external 
pressures to conform to different institutional logics, which makes it difficult for them to 
get funded, receive legal status, and achieve their first sales quickly.  
A Social enterprise’s centrality of competing institutional logics. As described 
above, the conventional wisdom of incorporating competing institutional logics is not 
always effective. Positive benefits from incorporating competing institutional logics can 
be expected only if intractable conflicts are well managed. It implies that social 
enterprises will incorporate differently a social welfare logic and a commercial logic in 
order to pursue their dual missions and minimize conflicts. This view emerges from 
Besharov and Smith’s (2014) introduction of the centrality of competing institutional 
logics. Accordingly, although scholars in social entrepreneurship encourage a social 




be equally influenced. If social enterprises utilized both logics in the same proportions for 
their core operations or strategies, centrality would be high. On the other hand, if they 
gave priority to one logic over another logic, centrality would be low. Although general 
statements about incorporating a social welfare logic and a commercial logic by social 
enterprises have assumed that the centrality of competing institutional logic should be 
high in social enterprises, social enterprises can incorporate varying degrees of centrality 
for both their social-welfare and commercial logics. This means that there can be 
effective variations in the levels of centrality for social enterprises. In addition, various 
conditions such as organizational and individual differences can influence the variance in 
effective centrality across organizations. Therefore, scholars believe that research on 
social entrepreneurship can be guided by a more nuanced view of the centrality of 
competing institutional logics (Besharov and Smith, 2014). 
Scale development for a social enterprise’s the centrality of competing logics. 
Since previous conceptual studies attempted to understand the centrality of competing 
institutional logics in social enterprises, existing research explicitly or implicitly calls for 
more systemic investigation of the factors that enhance or diminish the centrality of 
institutional competing logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Mair, Battilana, & Cardenas, 
2012; Pache & Santos, 2013). Nonetheless, an appropriate scale to measure the centrality 
of competing institutional logics in social enterprises is not available in the literature. In 
particular, previous studies have assumed that it is difficult to directly measure 
institutional logics because of their observable nature (Edelman 1990; Fligstein, 1985, 
1987; Fligstein & Brantley, 1992; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). 




institutional logics (Dunn & Junes, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), 
instead of developing relevant measure for assessing institutional logics at the 
organizational level. Lack of relevant dimensions and constructs of the centrality of 
competing logics in social enterprises can lead to paucity of empirical efforts for social 
entrepreneurship. Therefore, I will now review other analogous constructs, terms, or 
theories, which are included in three independent research areas: (1), work-family 
interface, (2) organizational ambidexterity, (3) organizational attention. Each of these 
provides a similar theoretical framework for social-commercial-logic, which help us to 
develop the measure of the centrality of competing logics. 
First, social entrepreneurial organizations engaging in both a social welfare logic 
and commercial logic are similar to individuals who maintain their work and family 
(Marks & MacDermid, 1996). Building on role theory (Aneshensel & Pearlin, 1987), 
conflict theory (Zedeck & Mosier, 1990), and the research of resource drain (Edward & 
Rothbard, 2000), the main stream of the research on the work-family interface has 
assumed that people have a fixed amount of resources to be allocated to their different 
roles (Rothbard, 2000). After acknowledging a resource trade-off, it suggests that level of 
the centrality of competing logics is dependent upon varying degree of inputs such as 
time, involvement, and commitment to distinct roles (Kirchmeyer, 2000). 
Second, it may also be useful to review ambidexterity because scholars have 
argued that such competing logics are equivalent to the idea of trade-off activities such as 
exploitation and exploration (Greenwood et al., 2011, p.351). Ambidextrous 
organizations simultaneously exploit ways of improving and refining products/services to 




Benner & Tushman, 2003) while they are also exploring sources of  new knowledge, 
searching, experimenting, and innovating (March, 1991). The ambidexterity literature 
assumes that exploitation and exploration are discrete choices (e.g., He & Wong, 2004; 
Jansen, Bosch, & Volberda, 2005), which require competition for scarce resources (Lavie, 
Stettner, & Tushman, 2010). Although there are universally accepted processes and 
scales for capturing ambidexterity, scholars measure exploration and exploitation 
separately; then, they assess the relative magnitudes of exploration and exploitation (He 
& Wong, 2004; c.f. Cao, Gedajlovic, & Zhang, 2009). Since the social enterprise’s 
centrality of competing logics is associated with the relative importance of social logics 
and commercial logics in social enterprises, following the approach of the difference 
between exploitation and exploration that is used by He and Wong (2004) would be 
appropriate for developing the scale of the centrality of competing logics.  
Third, although institutional logics are unobservable, they guide important issues 
to which decision makers in organization should attend (Ocasio, 1997). Institutional 
logics influence the overall behavior within a firm by directing organizational attention, 
defined here as “the distinct focus of time and effort by [a] firm on a particular set of 
issues, problems, opportunities, and threats and on a particular set of skills, routines, 
programs, projects, and procedures” (Ocasio 1997, p 188). Therefore, it is possible that 
social welfare logics and commercial logic can be regarded as organizational attention to 
social welfare issue and commercial issue, respectively because it assume that attention 
to social issues can well represent the social welfare logic; whereas, commercial issues 




In summary, a social enterprise’s centrality of competing institutional logics 
assumes that it is limited in scope by boundary conditions, which are drawn from the 
perspectives discussed above. First, competition for resources to respond to a social or 
commercial logic is inevitable. Second, the amount of inputs such as time, commitment, 
for both a social and commercial logic can determine the importance to both logics inside 
organizations. Third, the centrality of competing logics is assessed by the relative 
magnitudes of a social-welfare logic and a commercial logic. Forth, a social-welfare logic 
and a commercial logic could be constructed by attention to each logic.  
Stakeholders on the centrality of competing institutional logics. My dissertation, 
therefore, examines the conditions under which the centrality of competing institutional 
logics is higher or lower, especially from the view of stakeholders. Stakeholders are “any 
group or individual who can affect or be affected by the achievement of [a] firm's 
objectives” (Freeman, 1984:46). Although different organizations may claim different 
groups as key stakeholders due to this broad definition (Phillips & Reichart, 2000; Ryan 
& Schneider, 2003), Freeman’s (1984) they typically include shareholders, employees, 
customers, government bodies, and community/charitable groups (Agle, Mitchell, & 
Sonnenfeld, 1999). Central to stakeholder theory is that a firm is the locus of its 
relationships with stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; c.f., Parmar, et al., 2010). Similarly to 
agency theory, stakeholder theory also assumes an efficient market and views a firm as a 
nexus of contracts. Thus, it presumes that if a firm succeeds in effectively managing its 
complicated relationships with stakeholders, its welfare can be maximized (Harrison & 
John, 1996; Harrison, Bosse, & Philips, 2010; Walsh, 2005). In this regard, Harrison and 




nuanced information about a stakeholder’s utility functions, which makes it possible to 
achieve a competitive advantage. This is known as the stakeholder value maximization 
view or the instrumental approach. 
In fact, a distinct feature of social entrepreneurship is the “satisfaction of multiple 
stakeholders” (Lumpkin et al., 2013), mainly because they are the most influential in 
determining a firm’s dominant logic. In consideration of “organizations as complex 
entities composed of various groups promoting different values, goals, and interests” 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Pache & Santos, 2010: 459), responses to competing 
logics can be influenced by an organization’s associations with both external and internal 
stakeholders. Pache and Santos (2010: 458-459) explicitly argued that institutional 
demands can be conveyed by (1) “actors located outside [an] organization who 
disseminate, promote, and monitor [these demands across a] field,” and by (2) “staff 
members, executives, board members, or volunteers who adhere to and promote practices, 
norms, and values that they have been trained to follow or have been socialized into.” 
Therefore, generally, a firm’s responsiveness can be understood as a reaction to specific 
requests from stakeholders (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). 
Because of its importance, scholars have also called for research about integration 
between social entrepreneurship and stakeholder perspective (Moss, Short, Payne, & 
Lumpkin, 2011).  
In sum, a stakeholder perspective is an appropriate framework to analyze how 
social enterprises utilize competing institutional logics inside an organization. In other 
words, a more nuanced understanding of the centrality of both a social welfare logic and 




Intra-stakeholder heterogeneity perspective. Utilizing a stakeholder perspective 
as a framework, this dissertation focuses more on intra-stakeholder heterogeneity, which 
is defined as the degree of difference with respect to a common attribute X, such as 
demographics and preference within primary stakeholder groups (c.f. Harrison & Klein, 
2007; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). Although stakeholder research has identified distinct 
stakeholder segments, such as customers, employees, and suppliers, scholars have also 
suggested investigating the differences within each stakeholder group. For example, 
Harrison and Freeman (1999) argue that meaningful typologies can also exist within 
group stakeholders, which is known as intra-stakeholder heterogeneity (Fassin, 2008; 
Winn, 2001; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006), referring to the degree of variance in accordance 
with a common attribute X, within primary stakeholder groups (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). 
It is based on the acknowledgement that “all the stakeholders within a group are not equal” 
(Fassin & Gosselin, 2011, p.175). To understand the centrality, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at intra-stakeholder heterogeneity. Clearly, there are meaningful differences 
within each stakeholder group that can affect the centrality of competing logics in social 
enterprises.  
There are primarily two reasons why intra-stakeholder heterogeneity is important 
in this dissertation. First, the internal representation of competing demands comes from 
internal and external stakeholders. In fact, there are high degrees of heterogeneity within 
group stakeholders. Each member embedded in a different logic is likely to represent his 
or her demands differently, which influences the shaping of organizational responses. For 
example, Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) show that heterogeneous environmental preferences 




from firms. Specifically, plants related to community stakeholders with a stronger 
preference for the environment tend to reduce their toxic emissions more than those 
whose community stakeholders have weaker environmental preferences. This shows that 
organizational responses are not the result of the pressure from different groups of 
stakeholders, but the result of the pressure from certain kinds of intra-sub groups across 
each stakeholder group. Hence, internal stakeholder differences embedded in either a 
social-welfare logic or commercial logic are likely to be associated with different levels 
of power regarding a social enterprise’s managerial responses. It further impacts the level 
of centrality for both a social-welfare logic and a commercial logic  
Second, actors embedded in different logics within group stakeholders are also 
associated with their different levels of motivation for participating in social 
entrepreneurship. Motivational heterogeneity with within-group stakeholders captures the 
relevant variations in response to a social or a commercial logic. In fact, the most 
fundamental stakeholder motivations are not the same. Recently, applying social 
psychology and behavioral economics to stakeholder theory, Bridoux and Stoelhorst 
(2013) argued that potential stakeholders are comprised of self-regarding and reciprocal 
(pro-social) behavior. These heterogeneous motives distinguish their behavior as well. 
For example, self-regarding stakeholders are only concerned with personal benefits and 
their costs; whereas, reciprocators are willing to cooperate voluntarily (Bridoux & 
Stoelhorst, 2013). If members within a particular stakeholder group are primarily 
comprised of pure altruists whose motivations are altruism, not serving their own self-
interests, one would expect that the pressure from this group could encourage a social 




logic. It is particularly meaningful to consider motivation as an important dimension of 
heterogeneity for within-group stakeholders. Motivation is one of the most important 
factors that encourage actors to be involved in social entrepreneurship. In particular, pro-
social motivation, defined here as the “desire to expend effort to benefit other people” 
(Batson, 1987; Grant, 2008, p.49), has been regarded as one of the important triggers for 
involvement in entrepreneurship. Recently, for example, Miller et al. (2012, p.630) 
provided an in-depth view of how pro-social motivation and compassion encourage 
social entrepreneurship.  
In sum, the centrality of competing institutional logics can be influenced by the 
internal structure of power within each stakeholder group. Variations in the power 
structure, due to the composition of each stakeholder group, can exert different influences 
on the variation in the centrality of competing institutional logics. Although prior 
research implicitly suggested that considering heterogeneity in a primary stakeholder 
could be promising for understanding the   centrality of competing institutional logics, 
much less attention has been paid to how heterogeneity within a stakeholder group could 
impact the centrality of competing institutional logics  
A social entrepreneur as an imprinter. This dissertation also introduces a social 
entrepreneur as a key to the centrality of competing logics. The effects of a social 
entrepreneur on the centrality of competing institutional logics inside a social enterprise 
can be examined from an imprinting perspective. An imprinting perspective in 
organization studies emerges from Stinchcombe (1965) who described organizational 
structures as reflections of the environmental or industrial conditions at the time in which 




impact on the structure, strategy, and processes of organizations. Once the structure of an 
organization is established, it persists over time despite environmental changes. 
Stinchcombe’s imprinting hypothesis has evolved into several researchers identifying the 
effects of founders on the processes, practices, strategies, structures, or culture of the 
organizations that they found (Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 2001; Boeker, 1989; Burton, 
Sørensen, & Beckman, 2002; Johnson, 2007; Kimberly, 1979; Kimberly & Bouchikhi, 
1995; Phillips, 2002; also see the review of Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Simsek, Fox, & 
Heavey, 2015). In this regard, a founder is viewed as an “imprinter;” whereas, the 
organizations that he or she founds is regarded as “imprinted.” For example, Baron, 
Burton, and Hannan (1999, p.532) argue that “"[a] founder's blueprint likely 'locks in' the 
adoption of particular structures.”  
Scholars have explained a founder’s imprinting effects on an organization through 
four mechanisms (Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Nelso, 2003). First, an organization is 
strongly influenced by its founder’s preferences. For example, Kolympiris, 
Kalaitzandonakes and Miller (2015) show that a founder’s professional experience is the 
strongest factor for a firm’s location choice. They examined the several factors that 
influence a firm’s location choice for 187 biopharmaceutical companies founded by 275 
academic entrepreneurs, defined as “university faculties that engage in entrepreneurial 
activity ” (Di Gregorio & Shane, 2003, Kolympiris, Kalaitzandonakes, & Miller, 2015; 
Lockett et al., 2005). According to their analysis, academic entrepreneurs at a later stage 
of their academic careers are more likely to avoid starting their firms on campus; whereas, 
those at an earlier stage of their academic careers prefer an on-campus location to off-




Second, an organization is a reflection of a founder’s vision or identity. For 
example, from investigating two UK retailing companies both founded during the 1880s, 
Harris and Ogbonna (1999) found that there were similarities between their original and 
current strategies for both companies. They explained that a founder’s vision and initial 
strategy created a strategic legacy which continues to exist to date, leaving a significant 
impact on the current strategy of the focal organization. Thus, a founder’s identity plays a 
role in shaping an emerging organization (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Kimberly, 1979; 
Whetten & Mackey, 2002). In a longitudinal study on the development process of new 
medical schools, Kimberly (1979) showed that a Dean’s view and vision about learning 
medicine determined the curriculum of the schools. In the social entrepreneurship context, 
a similar result has been reported. In their survey of 162 Israeli social enterprises, Ruvio 
and Shoham (2011) demonstrated that a social entrepreneur’s personal motivation has an 
impact on the strategic choices of social enterprises.  
Third, founders may possess a more significant ownership stake in their 
organizations than any other stakeholders (Boeker & Karichalil; 2002; Daily & Dalton, 
1992; Rubenson & Gupta, 1996). In a sample of 468 IPOs (269 IPOs undertaken by 
founder-CEOs; 172 IPOs by non-founder CEOs), Fattoum and Delmar (2012) indicated 
that founder-CEOs retained more equity than non-founder CEOs. In addition, founder 
CEOs were significantly less likely to attract venture capitals or outside equities than 
non-founder CEOs. Similarly, Jain and Tabak (2008) also showed that founder-CEOs 
were more likely to occupy CEO and chairman position on boards of directors at the 




Forth, an organization can be viewed as an extension of its founder because an 
organization is a product of a founder’s psychological commitment or psychological 
ownership. Founders are likely to possess stronger psychological attachment than non-
founder CEOs (Pierce, Kostova & Dirks, 2001). Thus, it appears that social entrepreneurs, 
as founders of social enterprises, may have substantial influence upon the structures, 
processes, or strategies of the social enterprises that they founded. From the discussion 
above, I infer that their founders, who are social entrepreneurs, should influence the 
centrality of the competing social-commercial logics inside social enterprises. 
Social entrepreneurs and the centrality of institutional competing logics. From 
the above discussion, it is also important to understand how a social entrepreneur 
influences the centrality of competing institutional logics. First, social entrepreneurs are 
important actors who determine how organizations respond to competing logics. These 
actors are analogous to “institutional agents” (Kim, Shin, Oh, & Jeong, 2007), 
“institutional entrepreneurs” (DiMaggio, 1988), “institutional champion” (Haveman & 
Rao, 1997), or “institutional actors” (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Carronna, 2000). Kim et al., 
(2007: 289) explain that “[i]nstitutional agents are individuals or groups who willingly 
invest their resources, time, effort, and power in promoting a particular institutional logic 
along with organizational forms and practices that reflect that logic.”  
Second, a social entrepreneur must interpret strategic issues. Sense-making by top 
managers has been critical to organizational outcomes due to the complexity of the 
environment (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Thomas, Glark, Gioia, 1993). When strategic 
issues are evaluated within organizations, issue valences, such as whether information is 




(Denison, Dutton, Kahn, & Hart, 1996; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Thomas & McDaniel, 
1990).  The way decision makers evaluate the valence of an issue can affect differences 
in strategic actions (Bartunek, 1984; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Therefore, it is worth 
considering how the extent to which differences in evaluation by a social entrepreneur 
could influence the centrality of competing institutional logics.  
Third, a social entrepreneur as a decision maker plays a role in deciding resource 
allocation, which also impacts the strategic direction of a social enterprise because a 
firm’s strategic actions are by-products of choices made by decision maker(s) (Dean & 
Sharfman, 1996; Lovallo & Sibony, 2010). For example, extant research has shown that a 
firm’s outcomes occur, not because of resource endowment differences, but because of 
different usages of endowed resources (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Peteraf & Bergen, 
2003). Recently, Klingebiel and Rammer (2014) also confirm the importance of the 
heterogeneity of resource allocation, demonstrating how different resource allocation 
strategies impact variation in innovation performance. Hence, it is important to 
understand how the extent to which a social entrepreneur distributes resources within an 
organization could differentiate the centrality of competing institutional logics. The 
degree of the centrality of competing logics would vary in accordance with a social 
entrepreneur’s decisions on resource allocation within an organization (Bower & Gilbert, 






Research Questions and Research Objectives 
Research questions. This dissertation attempts to answer the following research 
questions. 
1. How and to what extent is the centrality of competing institutional logics in a 
social entrepreneurial organization influenced by heterogeneity within each 
important stakeholder?  
2. How and to what extent is the centrality of competing institutional logics in a 
social entrepreneurial organization influenced by a social entrepreneur? 
Research objectives. Focusing on the research questions above, this dissertation 
has the following objectives. 
1. Consider both theoretically and empirically the centrality of competing 
institutional logics within social enterprises. 
2. Offer the validated instrument to measure a social enterprise’s centrality of 
competing logics.  
3. Identify the relevant dimensions of heterogeneity within each important 
stakeholder group (e.g. shareholder, customer, and employee). 
4. Examine the potential direct effects of heterogeneity in each of the three 
stakeholder groups (shareholder, customer, and employee) on the centrality of 
competing institutional logics.  
5. Identify and examine the attributes of social entrepreneurs, which directly 
influence the centrality of competing institutional logics.  
6. Identify any other attributes of a social entrepreneur as contingent conditions 




Accordingly, this dissertation consists of two studies. As depicted in Figure 1, study one 
attempts to investigate the heterogeneities within each stakeholder group that are 
hypothesized to impact the centrality of competing logics. The second study explores the 
factors associated with a social entrepreneur that also can be hypothesized to influence 
the centrality of competing logics. Figure 1 presents a theoretical model describing the 
proposed conceptual model. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model for Hypotheses Testing 
 
Significance of the Study 
First, this dissertation offers a validated instrument to measure a social 
enterprise’s centrality of competing logics. Since the conceptual construct of the 
centrality of competing logics is recently identified in institutional logics scholarship 































been available yet. The dissertation provides empirical evidence that a social enterprise’s 
centrality of the centrality of competing logics and its two dimensions – a social welfare 
logics and a commercial logic – are reliable and validated through the data collected from 
the certified social enterprises in South Korea. Therefore, this dissertation can offer 
useful guidance for scholars are interested in conducting the research on the centrality of 
competing logics in social enterprises. 
Second, this dissertation analyzes social enterprises through the lens of an 
institutional logics perspective (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache, 2011; Pache & Santos, 
2010, 2013). Because social entrepreneurial organizations prefer to combine market-
based organizing (e.g., a commercial logic) with charity-based organizing (e.g., social 
welfare logic), scholars have applied an institutional logics perspective to an 
entrepreneurial social context (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013). I 
extend this research stream by employing both a stakeholder perspective and an 
imprinting perspective. In doing so, I attempt to connect four distinct research areas 
together, which are: (1) social entrepreneurship, (2) institutional logic, (3) intra-
stakeholder perspective, and (4) imprinting perspective. 
Third, my dissertation contributes to the literature on intra-stakeholder 
heterogeneity (Fassin & Gosselin, 2011; Harrison & Freeman, 1999; Kassinis & Vafeas, 
2006; Winn, 2001). By examining its relevant dimensions for three types of stakeholders 
(shareholders, customers, and employees), I am able to provide a more contextualized 
explanation of the centrality of competing institutional logics. 
Fourth, my dissertation introduces to social entrepreneurship research an 




understanding of the effects of the attributes of social entrepreneurs with regard to the 
centrality of competing institutional logics. Beyond motivational factors such as 
compassion  (Miller et al., 2012), social entrepreneurs can play a role in interpreting 
strategic issues (Thomas, Glark, Gioia, 1993) and resource allocation (Lovallo & Sibony, 
2010). By identifying a social entrepreneur’s specific attributes as either antecedents or 
moderators, I develop and examine a number of testable hypotheses.  
Fifth, this dissertation contributes to the literature by adding empirical evidence 
based on large-scale data. Despite the growing interest in social entrepreneurship, it has 
suffered from a lack of theoretical development and empirical testing. Progress in the 
field of social entrepreneurship requires rigorous statistics using larger scale databases 
and reliable measurement (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009). Hence, this dissertation not 
only collects large-scale data for social enterprises in South Korea, but also introduces 
many interesting testable hypotheses.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
 My dissertation is organized as follow. Chapter 2 (study 1) reviews previous 
studies on the theoretical development for the relationship between intra-stakeholder 
heterogeneity and the centrality of competing institutional logics. Also, Chapter 2 
develops testable hypotheses regarding the specific characteristics within three important 
market stakeholders: shareholder, customer, and employee groups. Chapter 3 (study 2) 
reviews the effects of a social entrepreneur’s prior work experience on an organization. In 
addition, Chapter 3 theorizes a relationship between a social entrepreneur’s non-profit 
experience and the centrality of competing logics. Furthermore, it examines a social 




Specifically, it identifies two important attributes of a social entrepreneur as moderators: 
ambivalent interpretation and a social entrepreneur’s career variety. Chapter 4 explains 
the methodological approaches, including the empirical setting, data collection, 
operationalization of variables, and analytic method for both study one and study two. 
Chapter 5 lists the analysis and results of hypotheses tastings detailed in Chapter 




















CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS– STUDY ONE 
Intra-stakeholder Heterogeneity and the Centrality of Competing Logics 
This dissertation identifies the effects of intra-stakeholder heterogeneity on the 
centrality of competing institutional logics, specifically by focusing on the extent to 
which characteristics within each stakeholder group lead social enterprises to enhance or 
lessen the centrality of competing institutional logics. Resource dependency theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978) supports a proposed notion that within-group heterogeneity 
influences the centrality of competing logics. 
A Resource Dependence Perspective. Because resource environments 
surrounding organizations are critical to a firm’s institutional logics (Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012), a social enterprise’s responsiveness is contingent upon its degree of 
dependence on critical stakeholder resources. In other words, a social enterprise’s 
response to social-commercial logic is directly or indirectly influenced by the degree to 
which it depends on stakeholder resources (Frooman, 1999). This perspective is 
associated with resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1979). Resource 
dependence theory assumes that organizations are open systems depending on critical 
resources (Ulrich & Barney, 1984). Because of this dependence, strategic responses 
should be understood within the context of a resource environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Basically, organizations respond to stakeholders in order to manage or reduce their 




Social enterprises share an even more intense concern for resource mobilization 
because they often operate in environments where access to quality resources at 
reasonable costs is elusive (Desa & Basu, 2013). Concerns about resource availability 
suggest that stakeholders who control the resources on which social enterprises depend 
exert a strong influence on the social-commercial logic in which they are embedded. 
Following this reasoning and findings, a social enterprise’s responsiveness to competing 
logics is mainly predicated on its differing levels of dependence on particular stakeholder 
resources. Thus, a resource dependence perspective implies that social enterprises are 
likely to give precedence to a particular logic embedded in specific stakeholders who 
hold the critical resources.   
Considering the concept of intra-stakeholder heterogeneity (Fassin, 2009; Winn, 
2001) – not all the stakeholders within a same group of stakeholder are same –however, 
stakeholder subgroups can elaborate further on the levels of dependency, which has 
impacts on social enterprises’ centrality of competing logics. For example, Fassin and 
Gosselin (2011) argued that many different subgroups within investors group have 
completely different objectives. In investigating the case of bankruptcy of Fortis, a 
European bank, they found that there are various subgroups within investor stakeholders 
such as long-term, short-term investors, small individuals, and large hedge funds. In 
addition, different subgroups of investor stakeholders gave pressures of different agendas 
and priorities. Similarly, Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) analyzed the pressures of 
stakeholder groups on firm environmental performance, and demonstrated that not only is 
there the internal heterogeneity of stakeholder groups, but also that different levels of 




focal firm activities. Specifically, they showed that firms perceive higher pressures to 
reduce their pollution level if they are located in wealth communities than poor 
communities. It is noted that subgroup regarding income levels within community 
stakeholders plays a significant role in improving firm environmental performance.  
From the previous discussion, specific stakeholder subgroup can determine the 
relative dependencies of the resources that the social enterprises feel scarce, which shapes 
the firms’ responsiveness. Thus, I posit that social enterprises are more likely to have 
higher level of centrality of competing logics when they have the larger portion of 
subgroup associated with both social and commercial logics within each stakeholder. 
When the portion of subgroup attached in both logics within each stakeholder is high, 
social enterprises may have a stronger incentive to incorporate both logics at the core of 
organizational functioning in order to reduce the pressures generated from the subgroup 
embedded in both logics. This perspective, therefore, proposes that identifying the 
subgroup associated with both social and commercial logics within each stakeholder 
groups would be the key to enhancing the high level of centrality of competing logics 
inside social enterprises. 
In order to identify the specific subgroup embedded in both logics; this 
dissertation focuses on market stakeholders such as investors, customers, and employees, 
rather than non-market stakeholders. Generally, stakeholders can be viewed as members 
of two groups, market stakeholders and non-market stakeholders (Baron, 1995; Stevens 
et al., 2005). Market stakeholders are the groups whose activities are associated with 
firms via economic transactions (Cummings & Doh, 2000). Market stakeholders consist 




stakeholders are regulatory agencies, government, and special interest groups. Because 
their interactions with firms are not guided by an economic purpose, non-market 
stakeholders are treated less urgently due to their lack of economic power (Stevens et al., 
2005).  Market stakeholders, however, are considered to be as salient as primary 
stakeholders due to their provision of critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Therefore, this dissertation will be bounded to the assumption that the roles of subgroups 
within market stakeholders are more effective on the centrality of competing logics than 
those within non-market stakeholders. In addition, this dissertation assumes that the 
portion of subgroup attached in both logics inside social enterprises can be influenced by 
the influx of social welfare logic within market stakeholders for social enterprises, 
thereby enhancing the centrality of competing logics for social enterprises.  
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In sum, I suggest that a social enterprise with high in-subgroup associated with 
both social and commercial logics within each stakeholder may increase the centrality of 
its competing institutional logics. Moreover, I focus on three market stakeholders: (1) 
investors, (2) customers, and (3) employees. Figure 2 presents a theoretical model 
describing the proposed relationships. 
Ethical Investor within Investor Stakeholder 
Investors or shareholders are important stakeholders (Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 
2004). Investors, as owners of a firm, have a tremendous impact through allocating scarce 
resources and pressuring managers. When they are not satisfied with managerial 
behaviors, they are likely to sell their shares (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 
2002), which jeopardizes the survival of a firm because they are its one of most powerful 
stakeholders (March & Simon, 1958). Thus, a firm has strong incentives to understand 
the interests of shareholders preferentially according to the magnitude of their ownership 
(Bloom & Hillman, 2007; Reid & Toffel, 2009). The importance of understanding the 
investors or funders is particularly great for social enterprises because social enterprises 
are heavily depending on wide range of funding sources from various types of investors 
whose motivations and expectations are also diverse (Austin et al., 2006; Letts, Ryan and 
Grossman, 1997). Nevertheless, systematic examinations on the relationship between 
investors’ expectations and the centrality of competing logics within social enterprises 
are scarce. Fundamentally, the important question remains regarding the extent to which 
investors with various motivations can pressure the social enterprises to increase or 




A traditional economic perspective has assumed that the primary shareholder 
objective is profit maximization; a firm has a fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders 
to protect and promote their financial interests (Bebchuk, 2005; 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Hart, 1993). Consequently, a manager’s duty is to make decisions to maximize the value 
of firm’s future cash flow (Brealey, Myers, & Marcus, 1995; Copeland, Murrin, & Koller, 
1994; Friedman, 1962).  
However, behavioral finance scholars have challenged the traditional assumption 
of wealth maximizing investment. According to an investigation by Nagy and 
Obenberger (1994), more than half of the criteria that affect an investor’s decision are 
unrelated to wealth maximization. Beal, Goyen, and Philips (2005) also assert that some 
investments are viewed as ethical or socially responsible investment (SRI). The Social 
Investment Forum, for example, reports that socially responsible investors own 11% of 
the assets in the US and 17% in Europe (Gollier & Pouget, 2012). Recent studies refer to 
this special group of investors as ethical investor or socially conscious investors (Mackey, 
Mackey, & Barney, 2007; Sandberg, Juravle, Hedesstrom, & Hamilton, 2009). Ethical 
investors or socially conscious investors are interested in more than their own wealth 
maximization. Rather, they also derive other benefits from investment (Lewis & 
Mackenzie, 2000). For example, besides maximizing their financial return only, the 
utility of ethical investment can be maximized by inclusion of different factors such as (1) 
the fun of participation, (2) the acquisition of an ethical identity, (3) the flow of pleasure 
(Beal et al., 2005).  
The rise of ethical investors whose motivations are not limited by financial returns 




enterprises. First, ethical or socially conscious investors more than likely have a 
willingness to accept below-market rate returns. For example, Renneboog, Ter Horst, and 
Zhang (2011) found out that ethical investors are less likely to be concerned about 
negative returns when they invest in ethical funds. Similarly, according to several 
experimental studies, investors whose decision frame is expressive in nature are likely to 
accept the lower financial return from the socially responsible investment choice (Glac, 
2009). Webley, Lewis, and Mackenzie (2001) also showed that ethical investors are more 
likely to keep badly performing ethical funds away from conventional investors. Their 
acceptance of low financial returns may allow social enterprises to be less dependent 
upon commercial activities unrelated to their core social value. It is known that if social 
enterprises should exclusively satisfy the market rate returns of traditional investors, 
social enterprises are likely to allocate their resources and energies to commercial 
activities, which diverts the social enterprises away from their social missions (Wang, 
2009). It may further decrease the centrality of competing logics. For example, Deeds and 
Anderson (2001; 2003) provide cases of how the domination of private investors with 
homogenous profit-maximizing objectives could have a negative impact on a social 
mission. They argue that conventional investors may want social enterprises to heavily 
engage in commercial activities regardless of an association with a social goal. This 
process could force social enterprises to abandon a core value. Other scholars are also 
concerned that unrelated commercial activities with emphasis on earned income 
generation can be a major source of trade-off between the social and commercial 




Second, as current finance literature on social entrepreneurship has illustrated, 
ethical investors with low financial return expectations are likely to assign more decision 
weight to the scalability of an operation (Frumkin, 2003; Moody, 2009). According to a 
new investment phenomena in the field of social entrepreneurship, ethical investors are 
associated with a social (impact) investment – defined here as “an investment made into 
social enterprises and social purpose businesses designed for the purpose of creating 
social impact” (Hill, 2011, p15), as well as a philanthropic venture capital (PhVC), also 
known as venture philanthropy –defined here as an intermediated investment in a small-
medium social enterprises with a potential for a high social impact (Scarlata & Alemany, 
2010; Scarlata, Alemany, & Zakarakis, 2012). These new investors may believe that 
social value creation and profit generation are not mutually exclusive; rather, scaling the 
operation of the business will give greater benefits to the society such as creating the jobs 
for disabled or serving low-cost products/services to the underdeveloped communities 
(Boschee, 2008; Chell, 2007; Hervieux et al., 2010). For them, a key to philanthropy is 
“getting tangible results” (Frumkin, 2003; p.9).  Thus, although they act as donors, 
venture philanthropists urge the organizations chosen for support to achieve substantial 
growth in order to spread the positive social impact as well. Considering the prior 
discussion, I hypothesize: 
H1: A greater proportion of ethical investors within an investor 





Reciprocity within Customer Stakeholder 
Buyers have the power to persuade a firm to do something (Rudell, 2006). 
Basically, like other economic stakeholders, customers are important constituents for the 
survival of a firm because of cash flow from customers (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; 
Reichheld & Sasser, 1990). Conventional attention has been directed to the “customer 
satisfaction” in marketing literatures as well as business magazines. If firms satisfy their 
customers, this could lead to higher customer loyalty, reduced transaction costs, and 
lower price sensitivities, which are ultimately positively related with economic returns 
(Anderson, Fornell, & Lehmann, 1994; Fornell, 1992). According to traditional 
transaction-specific view, customer satisfaction has been based on “post-purchase 
evaluation of product quality given pre-purchase expectations (Anderson & Sullivan, 
1993: 126).”  
In contrast, there is a growing view that customers are not only satisfied with the 
product performance that they purchase, but also concerned with labor conditions (Senser, 
1997), environmental friendly practices (Laroche, Bergeron, & Barbaro-Forleo, 2001; 
Suchard and Polonsky, 1991), or fair trading (Nicholls, 2010a). For example, it is 
reported that there is growing number of consumers who are willing to pay more for what 
they view as ethical products (Memery, Megicks, Angell, & Williams, 2012: 1284; Mohr 
& Webb, 2005). According to ethical consumerism research, UK consumers spent £25.8 
billion a year on ethical shopping in 2004, but £36 billion in 2009. Fair trade – “a social 
movement that aims to set fair prices for products, alleviate poverty, and assist producers” 
(White, MacDonnell, & Ellard, 2012: 103) – has also received much attention. The global 




their Belgian study, De Pelsmacker et al. (2005) showed that consumers are willing to 
pay 10% more for fair-trade products. Similarly, Italian customers are willing to pay 9% 
more for fair- trade products (Maietta, 2003). A new segment of consumers who consider 
environmental and social issues when they make purchase decisions also has been noted 
(Woolverton & Dimitri, 2010). It is known as lifestyles of health and sustainability, 
which has an acronym, LOHAS. About 17% of US consumers in 2006 were classified as 
LOHAS (Howard, 2008). 
A few studies have begun to study social entrepreneurship from the consumers’ 
standpoint. Researchers have recognized that customers affect social enterprises’ decision 
making on allocating their resources either to social or commercial activities in order to 
create value for their primary customers (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014). For example, 
Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair (2014) argue that social enterprises are likely to experience 
a prioritization of resource usages toward commercial activities if they serve economic 
consumers, or target mainly those who can pay for the products or services. It further 
implies that the buying motivations of intended customers are related to the centrality of 
social and commercial logics inside a social enterprise.  
Among various buying motivations, I would expect that reciprocal motivation, 
defined as a cultural norm whereby individuals enter into an exchange with the 
anticipation of the receiving the future benefit (Dawson, 1988), among a consumer 
stakeholder group inside a social enterprise may affect the determination of the level of 
centrality of social-commercial logics. Reciprocity is indicative of why consumers are 
interested in purchasing the goods or services produced by social enterprises. To date, 




others (Ames, Flynn, & Weber, 2004; Blau, 1963). Dawson (1988) argued that people 
who participate in charity giving are heavily motivated by the belief on the anticipation of 
receiving personal benefits from charity organizations (Adams, 1965; Dawson, 1988). 
Similarly, Andreoni (1989; 1990) argued that individuals who support any public good 
are not motivated solely by pure altruism. Rather, two components of (1) a desire to help 
(or, an altruistic motive), and (2) a personal positive benefits from helping others (an 
egoistic motive) may drive people to engage in supporting public goods. Koschate-
Fischer, Stefan, and Hoyer (2012) empirically confirm that both altruistic benefits and 
egoistic benefits such as the improvement of individual reputations can play a role in 
consumers’ positive reaction to companies’ donation activity.  
Reciprocally motivated consumers may exert social enterprises to not only 
provide economically qualified products/services, but also achieve the social benefits at 
the same time. For example, Hibbert, Hogg, and Quinn (2005) show the evidence that 
consumers who purchase the Big Issue, a street magazine to provide exclusively 
homeless people with the chance to become a vendor, expect both utilitarian value of 
magazine and helping dimension of the exchange. Similarly, UK government agencies as 
public service buyers from social enterprises claim that social enterprises should provide 
their ability to meet its financial and its social bottom line (Allan, 2005). It further 
implies that consumers involved in social entrepreneurship may view ideal social 
enterprises as the organizations or the firms that not only satisfy consumers’ desire to 
help others, but also provide other benefits such as qualified goods and services, 




In sum, consumers’ reciprocity motivation would be an important dimension of 
customer stakeholders in social enterprises on enhancing centrality of competing logic. 
Specifically, I expect that increasing the size of consumers motivated by reciprocity 
increases the likelihood that social enterprises will enhance both the social and 
commercial activities without prioritizing one over another.  
H2: A greater proportion of customers with high expectations of 
reciprocity within customer stakeholders will be associated with higher 
centrality for its competing institutional logics. 
Cross-Sector Workers within Employee Stakeholder 
Employees are not only major stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995), but they also 
influence organizational responsiveness to competing logics because they serve as 
carriers of the institutional logics into organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2012). Social 
enterprises consist of two broad types of employees--beneficiaries and regular staff. 
Beneficiaries refer to disabled people or other marginalized workers such as long-term 
unemployed or people in precarious situations (Ohana & Meyer, 2010; Spear & Bidet, 
2005). Specially, work integration social enterprises (WISE) normally offer a fixed-term 
contract and training to survive in the main labor market (Ohana & Meyer, 2010). On the 
other hand, regular staff employees are permanent and responsible to assist beneficiaries 
as well as do administrative tasks. This dissertation focuses exclusively on heterogeneity 
within permanent employees rather than including beneficiaries mainly because 
permanent employees (hereafter, employees) are competitive human resources for both 
social mission achievement and economic performance in social enterprises. Although 




education, this dissertation focuses on the prior work background of employees because it 
relates to employees’ attachment to distinct institutional logics, either a social welfare 
logic or commercial logic. 
Employees’ prior exposure to either a social welfare logic or a commercial logic 
due to their prior work experiences can determine their embeddedness in particular 
institutional logics, which can be translated into the focal organization. This notion is also 
similar to mainstream research on employees’ functional diversity, arguing that prior 
work experience can determine their belief structure, which leads to different preferences 
and interpretations of strategic issues (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). In the social 
entrepreneurship field, Battilana and Dorado’s (2012) case study would be the best 
example. According to their study, one of the microfinance organizations that incorporate 
both a banking (and finance) logic and a development logic hired employees based on a 
mix-and-match approach, defined as prioritizing an individual’s capabilities in a selection 
decision. As a result, there were two distinct groups of employees, one with a social-work 
background and another with a banking background. This example illustrates that 
employees persist in keeping themselves in particular logic where they have been 
exposed (Greenwood et al., 2011). In addition, they exert pressure that makes the 
organization conform to their initial institutional logics. Thus, prior work background for 
employee-stakeholders appears to be a strong driver, which impacts the ways that social 
enterprises respond to competing logics. 
In this dissertation, I expect that the rise of cross-sector workers who have work 
experience in both the non-profit and the for-profit sector may enhance the centrality of 




employees in the social entrepreneurship field are regarded as part of a homogenous 
group who are social-value oriented (Rawls, Ullrich, & Nelson, 1975), their work values 
may differ in accordance with prior work experience. Prior embeddedness in different 
institutional logics can be related to different normative values (Almandoz, 2012; Hirsch, 
1997). Recently, de Cooman and his colleagues (2011) compared the work values of 
employees in not-for-profit service organizations with those of employees in for-profit 
sectors. Employees in the not-for-profit sector placed a higher value on social service 
than employees in for-profit sector (de Cooman, Gieter, Pepermans, & Jegers, 2011). In 
addition, employees in the not-for-profit sector focused less on their career advancement 
than those in the for-profit sector. Thus, cross-sector workers are more likely to equip 
social enterprises with various work values and diverse points of view, which lead social 
enterprises to avoid dominating competing logic within organizations. 
Another feature of cross-workers rests on the notion that those from a diverse 
background would have more diverse expertise and resources, such as social contacts, 
outside knowledge, and information (Keller, 2001). Because an employee’s prior work 
experience in different institutional logics could serve as an information-related 
competitive advantage, this could broaden a social enterprise’s strategic options for 
responding to competing logics. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: A greater proportion of cross-sector workers within an employee 








CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS – STUDY TWO 
A Social Entrepreneur and the Centrality of Competing Institutional Logics 
In this chapter, I introduce a social entrepreneur’s non-profit experience as an 
antecedent of the centrality of competing logics. I also propose a curvilinear relationship 
between a social entrepreneur’s non-profit experience and the centrality of competing 
logics. Furthermore, I suggest two contingent conditions that will moderate the effects of 
a social entrepreneur’s non-profit experience on the centrality of competing logics 
Founder’s Prior Work Experience on New Organization. Research of the effects 
of founders on their new organization has also identified the importance of the prior work 
experience of founders. Being an entrepreneur is one of the decisions that could place 
one’s career at risk (see Sørensen & Sharkey, 2014; Carter, Gartner, Shaver, and 
Gatewood, 2003). Entrepreneurial careers, however do originate from nothing, but come 
from several different points of departure: (1) school to venture, (2) job to venture, (3) 
unemployment to venture, (4) home to venture, (5) venture to venture (Vesper, 1980). 
Among these different paths, the majority of entrepreneurs have experience working for 
existing organizations (Cooper, 1986). Sorensen and Fassiotto (2011) identify four 
aspects of why existing organizations matter in the entrepreneurial process. They are 
knowledge, values, social capital, and opportunities. Existing firms play a role in 




their desire and willingness to engage in entrepreneurship (Carroll & Mosakowski, 1987; 
Romanelli, 1989; Schoonhoven & Romanelli, 2001; Shane, 2000; Thornton, 1999). In 
addition, individuals develop innovative ideas in existing organizations and learn the 
practices of how to run an organization (Phillips, 2002, 2005).  
Furthermore, a founder’s previous work experience may have significant effects 
on the processes, structures, or strategies of her/his newly founded organization 
(McKelvey, 1982). Many theoretical arguments, as well as empirical research, have 
supported this idea mainly because previous job experience is strongly associated with 
the founders’ creation of a vision (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), preference (Philips, 2005), 
identity (Kimberly, 1979), knowledge structure (Beckman, 2006; Fern, Cardinal, & 
O’Neil, 2012), social capital (Shane & Stuart, 2002) prior to starting one’s organization. 
For example, Burton, Sørensen, and Beckman (2002) argue that previous founder job 
experience shapes in their venture strategies. They investigated a sample of 164 Silicon 
Valley based companies, and provided the evidence that founders whose previous 
employment in entrepreneurially prominent firms was more associated with 
implementing an innovative strategy than those from less prominent firms. Similarly, in 
the investigation of 431 Silicon Valley law firms, Phillips (2005) learned that founders 
who had previous work experience at the firms having a woman in a partner position are 
more likely to promote women into prominent positions in their newly founded law firm 
than those who worked at the firms having women in subordinate positions. Next, I will 
develop a set of hypotheses about the relationship between social entrepreneurs’ prior 
non-profit experience and the centrality of competing logics in their social enterprises. In 




entrepreneurs’ prior non-profit experience and the centrality of competing logics. Figure 










The Curvilinear Relationship Between a Social Entrepreneur’s Non-Profit 
Experience and the Centrality of Competing Institutional logics 
I argue that a social enterprise’s centrality depends in part on its founder’s non-
profit experience, which I define as the founder’s time spent previously working in the 
non-profit area prior to starting current social enterprise. Although there is no single 













theory that can directly explain the relationship between a social entrepreneur’s non-
profit experience and the centrality of competing logics inside a social enterprise, there 
are several potential explanations why the non-profit experience of a social entrepreneur 
can positively impact the centrality of competing logics based on motivation, industry 
specific knowledge, autonomy, and legitimacy. 
First, social entrepreneurship derives from prosocial motivation, defined here as a 
“desire to expend effort to benefit other people” (Batson, 1987; see Miller, et al.,2012). 
Motivation perspective, therefore, is related to a “preference sorting” mechanism. In 
other words, it is possible that potential social entrepreneurs prefer purposely to work in 
non-profit organizations before they start their social enterprises. It suggests that non-
profit organizations may attract individuals who not only place greater value on social 
responsibility, but also benefit from the satisfaction a working on socially desirable goods 
and services in non-profit areas. These individuals are more likely to be characterized by 
conscious self-control to fulfill a core value and their own self-perceived identities (Ryan 
& Deci, 2000). This characteristic may help individuals become ideal social 
entrepreneurs, which could assist their social enterprises to enhance both their social 
logic and commercial logic through well-defined goal, competence, and self-direction. 
Not surprisingly, scholars in social entrepreneurship have already shared the assumption 
that key difference between traditional entrepreneurs and social entrepreneurs is socio-
moral motivation via entrepreneurial initiatives (Bacq, Hartog, & Hoogendoorn, 2014; 
Nicholls, 2006, Shaw & Carter, 2007). In sum, individuals with non-profit experience are 





Second, a founder’s working experience in a similar industry would cultivate 
specific industry knowledge, which is positively related to organizational outcomes 
(Becker, 1975; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Delmar & Shane, 2006).  Grichnik et al. (2014) 
argue that experience helps individuals understand the rules of the industry game.  
Similarly, non-profit experience allows social entrepreneurs to acquire industry specific 
knowledge. By definition, the main purpose of social entrepreneurship is to create social 
value (Thake  & Zadek, 1997). The tasks of social entrepreneurs are (1) addressing social 
problems; (2) approaching them in innovative ways; and (3) mobilizing the resources 
(Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006). Because social entrepreneurship is 
inseparable from social problems, social entrepreneurs with non-profit experience may 
increase their ability to identify social problems, gather information, and acquire needed 
resources. In fact, extant studies suggest that prior specific industry experience helps 
founders grasp consumer needs (Levinthal & March 1993), identify more opportunities 
(Gruber, McMillan, & Thomson, 2008), get more precise information (Landier & 
Thesmar, 2009), and improve performance forecasting (Cassar, 2014).  
Third, non-profit organizations may provide their employees with the greater 
autonomy and decision-making discretion in uncertain situations (Borzaga & Tortia, 
2006). It is known that increased work autonomy will expose employees to broader 
information and to diverse contacts (Dobrev & Barnett, 2005). Broader exposure through 
non-profit experience enables potential social entrepreneurs to have a more diverse skill 
set for entrepreneurship. Empirical study also supported this perspective. In the second 
panel study of entrepreneurial dynamics (PSED 2), Hopp (2012) learned that a founder’s 




it is plausible that individuals with non-profit experience will be trained to be social 
entrepreneurs who can lead their social enterprises to achieve both a social and a 
commercial mission effectively. 
Finally, experience in the non-profit sector is more likely to legitimate founders as 
social entrepreneurs than experience in the for-profit-sector. According to organization 
theorists, legitimacy is important because an organization will be perceived as less 
desirable, improper, or inappropriate without gaining legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
Because lack of legitimacy could make it difficult for social entrepreneurs to gather 
supporters, resources, and endorsements from various stakeholders such as communities, 
governments, or donors, the importance of attaining legitimacy has been emphasized in 
the context of social entrepreneurship (Ruebottom, 2013). Previous studies proposed that 
the key to the legitimacy of social entrepreneurship is alignment with the non-profit 
sector (or social sector) (Pache & Santos, 2013; Parkinson & Howorth, 2008). In other 
words, founders with non-profit experience are insulated from the pressure of legitimacy 
acquisition.  For example, according to discourse analysis with social entrepreneurs, 
Parkinson and Howorth (2008) argue that social entrepreneurs perceive themselves to be 
legitimated because of their social morality, rather than through traditional 
entrepreneurial activities. Conversely, a founder without non-profit experience may 
perceive deficient legitimacy. It may keep her/his social enterprises from achieving a 
high level of centrality. Pache and Santos (2013) show that “social sector” origin could 
provide a social enterprise with “institutional freedom” (Pache & Santos, 2013, p.995), 




Therefore, I propose that there is a positive relationship between a social entrepreneur’s 
prior non-profit work experience and centrality. 
However, there may be a point above which an increase in a founder’s non-profit 
experience does not add to her/his social enterprise’s ability to achieve the centrality of 
competing logics. In other words, at higher levels of non-profit experience, added 
founder experience in the non-profit sector is likely to impede the strengthening of the 
centrality of competing logics. In fact, it may decline at high levels. I apply three 
perspectives to explain when (or why) a social entrepreneur’s non-profit experience can 
weaken the centrality of competing logics based on the constraints of knowledge 
structure, prioritizing socialization, and identity conflict. 
First, an excessive amount of non-profit experience may restrict a founder’s 
knowledge structure to the non-profit sector exclusively. In general, previous studies 
posit that experience above a certain point results in restriction or decision-making 
rigidities (Kotha & George, 2012; Sorensen & Stuart, 2001). This is mainly because 
individuals as decision makers are rationally bounded and prefer to exploit their existing 
knowledge (March & Simon, 1958). For example, from an investigation of the consumer 
digital imaging industry in the United States during 1991-2006, Benner and Tripsas 
(2012) demonstrate that prior experience shaped the firms’ belief structure, showing that 
firms with similar backgrounds are likely to introduce a similar feature for a digital 
camera. Similarly, in an analysis with 120 new entrants in air-transportation industry 
from 1995 to 2000, Fern, Cardinal, and O’Neil (2012) also show that the strategic choices 
of new entrants are strongly constrained by founders’ past experience. They argue that 




strategies of legacy firms” (p 427). The extant research, therefore, implicitly indicates 
that a social entrepreneur who may be overly experienced in non-profit sectors may fail 
to incorporate social and commercial logics due to the possibility of simply replicating 
the structures, practices, or strategies of non-profit organizations. 
Second, founders with an excessive amount of non-profit experience may not only 
hire employees with a background in social work, but also socialize them to prioritize 
social logic over commercial logic, which can decrease the degree of centrality of 
competing logics. Previous studies have documented the importance of the practices of 
socialization to maintain the hybridity of social enterprises (Battilana, et al, 2014; 
Battilana & Dorado, 2010). For example, in the study of French Work Integration Social 
Enterprise, Battilana and her colleague (2014) argue that it is possible for socially 
imprinted founders to set up an organizational system for social wealth maximization, not 
economic profitability.  
Third, founders who have largely spent their career within the non-profit sector 
may perceive their role more as “nonprofit workers” than “entrepreneurs.” Role identity 
refers to a person’s sense of self with regard to a specific role (Burke & Tully, 1997). 
According to identity theory, expectations and meanings associated with the role, such as 
a doctor, teacher, parent and a worker will guide individuals’ behavior. In addition, these 
social roles often are performed concomitantly (Stryker & Burke, 2000). Specifically, 
individuals have multiple role identities such as worker and students (Markel  & Frone, 
1998). For example, when someone is a worker and a student at the same time, he or she 
has multiple role identities. Multiple role identities, however, are not equally self-relevant 




with more meaning, which invokes behaviors related to salient role identity (Stets & 
Burke, 2000; McCall & Simmons, 1978). Because salience is affected by the amount of 
commitment (Stryker & Serpe, 1994), the idea of identity salience suggests that a long 
time spent in the non-profit sector can confer a stronger salience for a “nonprofit worker” 
identity than for an “entrepreneurial” identity, which helps social entrepreneurs with 
longer experience in the non-profit sector to enact supportive behaviors toward social 
logics, rather than commercial logics. There is similar evidence in academic 
entrepreneurship literature that indicates that tenured scientists who spent a long time 
being trained in academia are not likely to behave as pure entrepreneurs, despite their 
involvement to commercialization activities (Jain, George, & Maltarich, 2009).  
Consistent with the above reasoning, I hypothesize that a social entrepreneur’s 
non-profit experience to exhibit a non-linear relationship with centrality of competing 
logics.  The centrality of competing logics increases at a low-to-moderate level of a social 
entrepreneur’s non-profit experience, but turns negative for social entrepreneurs with a 
moderate-to-high level of non-profit experience. 
H4: There is a curvilinear relationship between a founder’s level of non-
profit experience and the centrality of competing institutional logics. 
Specifically, low–to-moderate levels of non-profit experience are 
positively related to the centrality of competing institutional logics; 
whereas, moderate-to-high levels of non-profit experience will have a 




The Moderating Role of a Social Entrepreneur’s Attributes 
I focus on two attributes of social entrepreneurs, which are associated with 
evaluating issues, allocating resources, and perceiving value: (1) a social entrepreneur’s 
ambivalent interpretation and (2) a social entrepreneur’s career variety. I expect these two 
variables to moderate the curvilinear relationship between the non-profit experience of a 
social entrepreneur and the centrality of competing institutional logics. More specifically, 
I expect the relationship between the non-profit experience of a social entrepreneur and 
the centrality of competing institutional logics to be more pronounced when overall a 
social entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation and his or her career variety is low than 
when it is high. 
Social Entrepreneur’s Ambivalent Interpretation. A social entrepreneur’s 
ambivalent interpretation refers to his or her competing evaluations of strategic issues 
(Plambeck & Weber, 2010). Strategic issues are environmental trends and events that 
could have a major, discontinuous impact on a firm (Ansoff, 1975: 24-25; Egelhoff, 
1982). When such issues are evaluated simultaneously as having both a positive and 
negative impact, ambivalence occurs (Plambeck & Weber, 2010). I expect that the 
curvilinear relationship between non-profit experience of a founder and the centrality of 
competing institutional logics will be less profound in social enterprises with an 
entrepreneur who evaluated strategic issues ambivalently. This is likely to be reasonable 
for several reasons.  
First, a social entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation of strategic issues could be 
considered as an organizational condition that might impact an unbiased resource-




either to social activities or commercial activities if a social entrepreneur has a high level 
of ambivalent interpretation, even if a social entrepreneur lacks non-profit experience or 
spends too much time in the non-profit sector prior to starting a social enterprise. Both 
behavioral decision theory (BDT) and strategic issue diagnosis (SID) have assumed that 
strategic decisions are connected by cognition, emotion, and social behavior (Powell, 
Lovallo, & Fox, 2011). These theories suggest that resource-allocation decisions are 
based on how a strategic issue is framed, either positively or negatively (e.g., Bateman & 
Zeithaml, 1989; Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber, 2001; 
Dutton, 1997; Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 1995; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). 
Extant research argues that positively evaluated issues are more likely to attract the 
organizational resources than negatively evaluated issues do (Bateman & Zeithaml, 1989; 
Ginsberg & Venkataramn, 1995). According to the current research, however, ambivalent 
individuals are less likely to evaluate issues, either as positive or negative. Rather, they 
try to develop an holistic view of the issues (Petty et al., 2007). Thus, organizations with 
highly ambivalent CEOs may allocate resources equally to either positively evaluated 
issues or negatively evaluated ones because their CEOs are more likely to evaluate 
simultaneously the strategic issues as positive and negative. Applying this argument to 
this study suggests that critical resources will be distributed less differently either to 
social activities or commercial activities if a social entrepreneur has highly ambivalent 
interpretation, even if a social entrepreneur lacks non-profit experience or spends too 
much time in the non-profit sector prior to starting a social enterprise.  
Second, a social entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation of strategic issues is 




capacity of an organization to achieve high levels of trade-off (Cao et al., 2009). A social 
entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation can be related to a broad-minded focus on 
strategic positions, which was linked to a wider spectrum of issues (Plambeck & Weber, 
2010: 693-694). Those in which social entrepreneurs interpret issues most ambivalently 
improve their ability to have a wider spectrum of strategic issues. This wider spectrum of 
strategic issues generated by ambivalent social entrepreneurs can become essential for 
dealing with the obstruction of high degree of centrality of competing logics. 
Third, a social entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation was also associated with 
managerial perception, which is “important values lead to actions consistent with them” 
(Adams, Lincht, Sagiv, 2011: 1334; Sagiv et al., 2011; Verplanken and Holland, 2002). 
By evaluating both logics as valued, ambivalent social entrepreneurs are less likely to 
respond more to one of them, although there is pressure to do so due to their limited or 
higher range of non-profit experience. 
Thus, it is logical to assume that positive benefits of low to moderate levels of the 
founder’s non-profit experience on the centrality of competing logics may become less 
salient for social enterprises with a founder whose ability of ambivalent interpretation is 
high. At the same time, at a moderate-to-a-high level of founder non-profit experience, 
the negative of a direct relationship with the centrality of competing logics will weaken 
as a social entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation increases. Under this condition, as the 
non-profit experience of a founder increases, any diminishing returns to the centrality of 
competing logics may be mitigated through unbiased-resource allocation, organizational 
ambidexterity, and unbiased value perception. In this light, the curvilinear effects of the 




logics will be less likely to be profound if social entrepreneurs evaluated issues more 
ambivalently. 
H5: A social entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation will moderate the 
curvilinear relationship between his or her non-profit experience and the 
centrality of competing logics; specifically, the curvilinear relationship 
will be less pronounced (i.e., exhibit lesser curvature) among social 
enterprises with their founder exhibiting a higher level of ambivalent 
interpretation than social enterprises with their founder exhibiting a lower 
level of ambivalent interpretation..  
A Social Entrepreneur’s Career Variety.  A social entrepreneur’s career variety 
is similar to CEO career variety, which refers to “the array of distinct professional and 
institutional experiences an executive has had prior to becoming a CEO” (Crossland, 
Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick, 2013). Social-entrepreneur-career variety may also moderate 
the curvilinear relationship between the non-profit experience of a social entrepreneur 
and the centrality of competing institutional logics. Similar to the moderating role of a 
social entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation, I also expect that an organization with a 
social entrepreneur who is low in career variety will magnify the impact of non-profit 
experience of the social entrepreneur on the centrality of competing institutional logics. 
The reasons are threefold. 
First, one of the features of CEO career variety is an awareness of a wide array of 
paradigms and exemplars (Crossland et al., 2013). High-variety CEOs seem to possess 
cognitive breadth, defined as an awareness of multiple perspectives, which makes it 




generate creative solutions (Crossland et al., 2013). Based on this notion, broad 
knowledge about multiple perspectives implies that a high-variety social entrepreneur 
might understand a broad range of knowledge about the needs and demands, the so-called 
“utility function” of customers, funders, and other important resource providers than low-
variety social entrepreneur (Harrison et al., 2010). Harrison and his colleague (2010) 
argue that if a firm can acquire nuanced information about a stakeholder’s utility function, 
a firm can fine-tune strategies to deal with the demands of stakeholders, increase capacity 
for unexpected events, and generate a high level of innovation. Building on this notion, I 
expect that at low-to-moderate levels of a social entrepreneur’s non-profit experience, a 
positive relationship with the centrality of competing logics will strengthen as a social 
entrepreneur’s various career-spanning activities increase. Under these conditions, social 
entrepreneurs with a high level of career variety benefit from a high level of cognitive 
breadth through their various career-spanning activities. These benefits may help social 
entrepreneurs understand what consumers want, how to approach the market, or how to 
gain legitimacy effectively, despite having relatively limited non-profit experience. It 
may lead to a higher level of centrality for the competing logics. Conversely, these 
benefits help to mitigate the negative relationship with centrality at a moderate-to-high 
level of non-profit of social entrepreneurs as their career variety increases because open 
mindedness from career variety may also help social entrepreneurs overcome the 
constrained knowledge structure, restricted hiring processes, and social mission oriented 
identity generated from excessive amount of time spent in non-profit sector.  
Second, CEO-career variety is also associated with a CEOs’ social capital, which 




outside an organization (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Social capital can be generated by both 
past and current professional experiences (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The benefit of a 
manager’s (or CEO’s) social capital has been reported in the management literature 
(Geletkanycz, Boyd, Finkelstein, 2001; Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong, & Kor, 2013). 
For example, social capital shapes the conditions that convey knowledge and resources 
into an organization by broadly connecting to both inside and outside groups (Cao, 
Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006). A high level of CEO social capital provides the capability 
to understand diverse opinions (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
High internal social capital also allows CEOs to control the allocation of knowledge and 
resources within an organization (Cao et al., 2006; Cao, Simsek, & Jansen, 2012). 
Third, a CEO’s accumulated career experience can be also associated with 
increases in human capital. Human capital refers to acquired knowledge and skills via 
investments in schooling, on-the-job training, and work-related experience (Becker, 1975; 
Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbush, 2011). Pertinent research has generally supported a 
positive relationship between entrepreneurs’ human capital and effective and efficient 
management of their ventures (Chandler & Jansen, 1992; Cooper, Gimeno, & Woo, 1994; 
Gimeno, Folta, & Cooper, 1997). This is mainly because accumulated experience through 
various types of careers may provide a CEO with an effective management skill sets to 
different value environments. For example, Carpenter, Sanders, and Gregersen (2001) 
show that multinational companies with CEOs having international experience 
outperform than those with CEOs without such experience. Carpenter et al. (2001) 
interpret this finding as being due to the positive effects of experience on dealing with 




Even if social entrepreneurs are not familiar with the social sector environment 
due to a lack of non-profit experience, social entrepreneurs having various career paths 
can easily achieve a high level of centrality through her/his accumulated social capital 
and human capital. Conversely, at moderate to high levels of founder’s non-profit 
experience, the negative relationship with centrality will be attenuated if social 
entrepreneurs have high level of career variety because wider range of social capital, as 
well as cultivates greater human capital through their various career paths may enable 
them to minimized the drawbacks such as the knowledge constraints, preference for 
social workers, and fixed identity due to the excessive amount of non-profit experience. 
Collectively, these arguments suggest that I expect a curvilinear relationship between the 
non-profit experience of a social entrepreneur and the centrality of competing logics, 
which will be weaker for social entrepreneurs with a high degree of career variety. The 
above arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
H6: A social entrepreneur’s career variety will moderate the curvilinear 
relationship between his or her non-profit experience and the centrality of 
competing logics; specifically, the curvilinear relationship will be less 
pronounced (i.e., exhibit less curvature) among social enterprises with 
their founder having a higher career variety than social enterprises with 








CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
Empirical Setting and Data 
The sampling frame is Korean social enterprises. Korean social enterprises 
provide a particularly appropriate context to study how a social enterprise’s centrality of 
competing institutional logics may be influenced by heterogeneity in each stakeholder 
group. There are several reasons why testing hypotheses on a sample of Korean social 
enterprises is beneficial. 
First and foremost, this sampling frame overcomes the problem of identifying 
social enterprises. There is a general absence of accepted definition or identification of 
social enterprises in the field of social entrepreneurship (Smallbone & Lyon, 2005). 
Previous researchers have heavily relied on self-identified social enterprises (Miller & 
Wesley, 2010). This lack of identification also leads to challenges of conducting 
empirical studies with a large sample (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009). In order to 
overcome the difficulty of identification, South Korea has used an approval system for 
social enterprises using solid criteria. Organizations that fail to satisfy the criteria have 
not been allowed to use the term “social enterprise” (Bidet & Eum, 2011; Park & Wilding, 
2012), which was mandated under Act 19 of Social Enterprise Promotion Act (SEPA) 
since 2007. The Act legally defines a certified social enterprise as a “an organization 
which is engaged in business activities, such as producing and selling goods and services, 




of providing social services and creating jobs for the disadvantaged” (article 2; Bidet & 
Eum, 2011, p.77). Specifically, “Social Enterprise Support Committee is responsible for 
deciding whether the organization is certified or not as a social enterprise (article 4, Bidet 
& Eum, 2011, p.78).” “Organizations should provide the proof of the relationship 
between their activities and a social goal (Bidet & Eum, 2011, p.78).” Certificated social 
enterprises should re-invest their profits in social causes (article 8).  
Second, South Korea is a society in which social and commercial logics are more 
fiercely separated than other countries. For example, styles of business management in 
South Korea have been influenced by U.S. firms (Dyer and Chu, 2003); whereas, its 
welfare system follows the ‘Nordic’ or ‘social-democratic’ welfare regime of European 
countries (Bidet, 2012; Gough, 2001; Kuhnle, 2003). Thus, South Korean social 
enterprises may demonstrate a clearer influence than in most other setting to examine 
social and commercial logics inside organizations.  
Third, when social entrepreneurship was initiated in South Korea, the best 
features of the concepts from both Europe and USA were studied in order to implement 
the most ideal social enterprises (Bidet & Eum, 2011). South Korean policies were 
enacted based on 1991 UK and Italian case law. Thus, as an emerging market, South 
Korea expands our understanding social entrepreneurship in a different, international 
context. 
Consequently, the majority of data for this dissertation was collected from a 
survey of Korean social enterprises using Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 
(KSEPA)’s directory, which has tracked 1,012 certified social enterprises. Following the 




with social entrepreneurs between April and July 2013. I purposely selected the 
organizations and targets to understand the phenomena of responsiveness to competing 
institutional logics as well as refine the questionnaire’s items in depth. Appendix C 
provides a brief description of the 11 social enterprises that I interviewed. After 
considering the feedback I received and reflecting on many concerns, I prepared the final 
questionnaire. I created the questionnaire in English first, later translating it into Korean, 
consistent with the suggestion of Brislin’s (1970) translation-back-translation.  
I sent an email containing the final questionnaires to 1,002 eligible social 
enterprises listed by the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (KSEPA) over four 
months from April to July of 2014 .The email explained the goal of this study, the 
voluntary nature of participation, its confidentiality policy, and a link of the survey’s 
Web site. In line with current studies, the letter promised that an executive summary 
would be given as incentive to each participating social enterprise (Heavey & Simsek, in 
press). After sending an invitation to participate in the web-based survey, I emailed three 
reminders and made several phone calls according to the recommendations (Kriauciunas, 
Parmigiani, & Rivera-Santos, 2011). A total of 281 responses from CEOs were returned, 
representing an initial response rate of 28.04%, which compares favorably with other 
studies surveying top managers (Heavey & Simsek, in press; Schilke & Cook, 2013).  
In order to avoid common method bias and social desirability bias--defined as the 
tendency that respondents are likely to report overly “good behavior” and rarely “bad 
behavior”--prior research has suggested using third-party observers as informants instead 
of using CEOs as key informants. Following this suggestion, I contacted the 281 social 




attended to in high-level discussions. This approach is also consistent with the suggestion 
for using multiple survey informants (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993). In total, 203 
social enterprises have completed two sets of surveys.  I deleted 13 responding firms due 
to missing data, resulting in a total of 190 usable responses (for a total usable response 
rate of 18.96%).  
Nonresponse bias. To assess sample representativeness, I tested for a potential 
non-response bias in three different ways. First, as seen in Table 1, I contacted 30 non-
respondents randomly by the telephone and asked them to provide demographic 
information about their company (c.f. Mentzer, Flint & Hult, 2001). Then, I compared 
group mean differences between respondents and 30 non-respondents on those 
background characteristics such as firm age, firm size, number of board of directors, and 
debt ratio 2012. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) of group means revealed no 
significant differences (see the Table 1; Fs<0.10, p>0.10). 
 





Second, following the recommendations (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Dooley & 
Lindner, 2003), I compared early respondents with late respondents on key theoretical 
constructs (Top management’s attention to social and commercial issues, proportion of 
ethical investors/reciprocally motivated customers/cross-sector workers, founder’s non-
profit experience, and ambivalent interpretation) as well as several control variables such 
Variable df F p-value 
Firm Age (log) 1, 253 0.002 0.962 
Number of employees (log)  1, 253 0.051 0.822 
Number of BOD  1, 253 0.086 0.770 




as the natural log of firm age, firm performance, future expectation of performance, debt 
ratio, founder’s age, and gender. On average, 38.5% of sample responded to the early 
mailing, while 61.5% of my sample was late responders.  
 
Table 2. Test of Non-Response Bias: Early vs. Late 
 
As shown in Table 2, the results of the t-tests indicated no significant differences 
between early and late respondents (p > 0.10). Finally, I compared the firms in the 
samples to 1,002 firms in the initial mailing list with respect to the social enterprises’ 
categories (5 categories). A  Komogorov – Smirnov (KS) two-sample test identified no 
Variable 









TMT’s  attention to social issue 5.279 5.227 0.383 0.702 
TMT’s  attention to financial issue 5.482 5.394 0.625 0.533 
Firm age (log) 1.633 1.599 0.437 0.662 
Financial performance 4.345 4.326 0.137 0.891 
Attainment Discrepancy (dummy) 0.163 0.113 1.065 0.288 
Debt ratio 2012 0.227 -0.015 0.266 0.790 
Diversity of BOD 0.273 0.325 -1.429 0.154 
Duality (dummy) 0.796 0.786 0.170 0.865 
Proportion of ethical investors 0.589 0.498 1.619 0.107 
Proportion of reciprocally  
motivated customers 0.103 0.120 -0.570 0.570 
Proportion of cross-sector workers 0.263 0.184 1.535 0.127 
Founder’s non-profit  experience 6.279 5.924 0.452 0.652 
Founder’s for-profit experience 7.226 6.405 0.915 0.362 
Ambivalent Interpretation 1.188 1.533 -1.245 0.214 
Career Variety 1.727 1.542 0.625 0.533 
Founder’s age (log) 3.913 3.897 0.680 0.497 
Founder’s education 3.980 3.880 0.612 0.541 




significant differences between two groups. (χ² = 8.114, p =.09 >0.05). With this range of 
three tests, nonresponse bias in this study was not a problem. 
Study One: Measures, Validation, and Statistical Procedures 
Dependent Variable  
Centrality of Competing Logics. The primary dependent variable in this study is 
the centrality of competing institutional logics. Following the discussion in Chapter 1, I 
regarded a social welfare logic and a commercial logic as top management’ attention to 
social welfare issue and commercial issue, respectively. Adopting the process by Weaver, 
Trevino, and Cochran (1999) and Muller and Kolk (2009), I listed a broad range of topics 
from which top managers may have discussed at the time of high-level discussions 
because topics in high-level discussions are considered as important issues (Weaver, 
Trevino & Cochran, 1999). Then, I asked to rate “the extent to which various subjects 
were a topic of conversation for their firm's top management team” (Weaver, Trevino & 
Cochran, 1999: 549). To be specific, middle managers as respondents assessed how often 
top managers discussed: (1) seeking the good of society, (2) the company’s role in 
society, (3) improving social conditions, (4) efforts for beneficiaries, (5) financial 
performance, (6) stockholders and investors, (7) strategy and planning, and (8) 
productivity and efficiency. Middle managers were asked to complete a randomly 
ordered eight-item list of questions on a 7-point Likert-style scale (1=never, 7=very 
frequently) top management attention scored such that higher numbers will reflect a 
greater attention to social welfare issues and financial issues. First four indicators 
pertained to top management’s attention to social issues and second four items pertained 




To evaluate the reliability and validity, I calculated Cronbach’s alpha for each 
four items, which yielded an acceptable single scale with Cronbach alpha = .90 for 
attention to social issues and .75 for commercial issues.1  Then, I used confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) to examine the validity of measures. I specified top management’s 
attention to social and financial issues as first-order factors with each four indicators, 
respectively. Although the result showed acceptable model fit (𝑥2(18) = 37.58; 𝑥2/
𝑑𝑓 =2.08; CFI = 0.976;TLI = 0.962; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
= 0.075), the standardized factor loading of one indicator (6. stockholders and investors, 
SFL= 0.35) was below the recommended threshold of .05 (Hair et al., 2009). Thus, I 
dropped the sixth item from the measures and re-calculated Cronbach’s alpha for top 
management’s attention to commercial issues. Afterward, I performed CFA for two first-
order factors again. Overall, Cronbach’s alpha was increased from 0.75 with four items to 
0.83 with three items for top management’s attention to commercial issues. The modified 
result of CFA also confirmed better fit (𝑥2(12) = 26.46; 𝑥2/𝑑𝑓 =2.20; CFI = 0.982; TLI 
= 0.968; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.078). All factor loadings 
were also higher than the cutoff point (range from 0.75 to 0.90) and significant (p<.001). 
According to Shook, Ketchen, Hult, and Kacmar (2004), discriminant validity is 
satisfactory if the average variance extracted (AVE) exceeds the cutoff of 0.5. AVE 
values of 0.67 for top management’s attention to social issues, and 0.62 for commercial 
issues were obtained in this study, which indicated acceptable discriminant validity. 
Consequently, the construct of top management’s attention to social issues was computed 
as the average of the four items; whereas, the construct of top management’s attention to 
                                                          




commercial issues was a mean of three items. Individual item scales, standardized factor 
loadings, Cronbach’s alpha, and AVE are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Validity Assessment for Constructs of Top management’s attention to 
competing issues 
Constructs Items Mean SD SFL
c 
Top management’s 




Seeking the good of society 5.14 1.35 0.75*** 
The company’s role in society 5.36 1.22 0.86*** 
Improving social conditions 5.12 1.20 0.90*** 
Efforts for beneficiaries 5.40 1.17 0.77*** 
Top management’s 
attention to commercial 
issues
b 
Financial performance 5.21 1.29 0.72*** 
Strategy and planning 5.57 1.18 0.86*** 
Productivity and efficiency 5.66 1.23 0.78*** 
*Note: 
a Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90, AVE= 0.67, b Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82, AVE= 0.62;                                 
c
 Standardized Factor Loading, *** P<.001 
To capture the centrality of competing logics, I used Janis-Fadner (JF) coefficient 
of imbalance, which has been widely used to calculate media tenor (Deephouse, 1996; 
Pollock & Rindova, 2003) and work-family balance (Greenhaus, Collins, & Shaw, 2003). 
This coefficient allows us to measure the relative proportion of top management’s 




 𝑖𝑓 𝑆 > 𝐶; 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐹 = 𝑆; 
(𝑆𝐶 − 𝐶2)
𝑇2
 𝑖𝑓 𝐶 > 𝑆  , 
where S represents top management’s attention to social issues, C is the attention to 
commercial  issues, and T is the total attention. The range of this variable is -1 to 1, 
where 1 equals "attention to all social issues" and -1 equals "attention to all commercial 
issues." To interpret them, a score of zero represents equal weighting for top 
management’s attention to both competing issues, which further indicates a high level for 
the centrality of competing institutional logics. On the other hand, positive scores 




focus. The greater the absolute number of a score suggests unequal weighting for top 
management’s attention to both competing issues, which corresponds to a low level of the 
centrality for competing institutional logics. I converted the negative scores to absolute 
value. In order to facilitate interpretation, I also reversed absolute number of the score by 
multiplying constant -100 so that a greater value indicates higher level of the centrality of 
competing logics. Maximum is 0.00, minimum is -35.35 
Independent Variables   
All independent variables are used with one year lagged variables.  
Proportion of Ethical investors. Ethical investors are largely understood that their 
investments are the ones without an expectation of financial return (Höchstädter & 
Scheck, 2014, Moore et al., 2012). Adopting the categories developed by Spiess-Knafl 
and Achleitner (2012), I identified six categories: (1) an investment from inside investors 
without an expectation of financial return, (2) an investment from inside investors with a 
reduced financial return expectation, (3) an investment from inside investors with a 
market rate financial return expectation, (4) an investment from outside investors without 
a financial return expectation, (5) an investment from outside investors with a reduced 
financial return expectation, (6) an investment from outside investors with a market rate 
financial return expectation. I asked respondents to estimate the proportion of 
investments falling into a number of investment classifications. In this study, the 
proportion of ethical investors was calculated as the ratio of internal and external 
investments without financial expectations to the total investments in the social 




Proportion of reciprocally motivated Customers. I captured four customer-group 
categories based on initial motivations for buying the products of social enterprises 
(Hibbert, Hogg, & Quinn, 2005). I asked respondents to estimate the proportion of buyers 
falling into a number of classifications: (1) beneficiaries, (2) economic customers, (3) 
reciprocally motivated customers, and (4) pure altruistic customers. The proportion of 
reciprocally motivated customers was measured by the ratio of customers motivated by 
reciprocity to the total customers in the social enterprises. The higher scores represent the 
greater proportion of customers motivated by reciprocity.  
Proportion of cross-sector workers. To construct the percentage of cross-sector 
workers, I classified employees into four different groups using their prior work 
experience: (1) social sector, (2) commercial sector, (3) both social and commercial 
sectors, and (4) non-experience. Then, I measured the proportion of cross-sector workers 
using the ratio of employees having work experience in both social and commercial 
sectors to the total employees in the social enterprises. The higher scores represent the 
greater proportion of cross-sector workers.   
Control Variables 
Because many other factors could systematically affect the pressure to respond 
more decidedly using either a social logic or a commercial logic, I include numerous 
variables in the analysis for the purpose of control. 
Total attention to issues. According to previous research, no differences would be 
expected if there were little involvement with both competing issues (Greenhaus, et al., 
2003). It means that the centrality of competing logics can be substantially influenced by 




to competing issues were incorporated in the control variables. This value was calculated 
by the sum of top management’s attention to both social issues and commercial issues. 
Legal status. For social enterprises, there are broadly two kinds of legal status, 
which are a nonprofit form such as an incorporated association, a trust, or a foundation, 
or a for-profit form such as a proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation (Kistruck & 
Beamish, 2010; Austin et al., 2006; Mair & Marti, 2006; Young, 2001). To date, most 
social entrepreneurship literature has treated social entrepreneurial organizations as a 
homogenous group. However, legal status on either for-profit or nonprofit forms itself 
makes a difference to several activities. It is not only directly associated with tax, funding, 
or opportunities (Dees & Anderson, 2003; Kistruck & Beamish, 2010; Korosec & 
Berman, 2006; Simms & Robinson, 2009), but also related to the practices of the social 
enterprises. For example, although non-profit social enterprises such as incorporated 
associations can receive philanthropic support from outside (e.g. government or 
voluntaries) to subsidize their costs (Dees & Anderson, 2003), for-profit social 
enterprises such as limited liability companies are not able to do so. On the other hand, if 
a social enterprise acquires a non-profit legal form, one can expect this social enterprise 
should limit its profits to be distributed to investors or owners, which is known as a non-
distribution constraint (Hansmann, 1980). Thus, I controlled for legal status by using 
dummy code, which it is dummy coded “1” when a social enterprise has a for-profit legal 
status, and “0” if it has a non -profit legal status.  
Prior performance. The extant literature has suggested that there is a positive 
relationship between a firm’s performance and its investment in corporate social 




(BTOF, Cyert & March, 1963) argues that past performance can serve as a firm’s 
aspiration level (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005). According to past 
performance, we can also calculate attainment discrepancy, defined as a firm’s relative 
performance compared to past performance (Aroa & Dharwadkar, 2011). For example, if 
actual performance exceeds the aspired performance, shareholders become trust 
managers providing them with higher discretion to allocate resources. Trust management 
is also significantly associated with a higher level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
(Aroa & Dharwadkar, 2011). It further implies that past performance and attainment 
discrepancy could impact the centrality of competing institutional logics. Consequently, I 
controlled for prior performance using eight items, a 7-point Likert scale that was 
validated and often used in the previous research (Stam & Elfring, 2008; Wang & Bansal, 
2012). Respondents were asked to compare their social enterprises’ performance with 
other similar social enterprises in each area on a scale ranging from 1, “your organization 
was much worse,” to 7, “your organization was much better than similar organizations.” 
The Cronbach’s alpha was .94, which exhibits acceptable inter-item reliabilities. A 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was also conducted to gauge the validity of the 
measures. The result showed acceptable model fit (𝑥2(14) = 25.35; 𝑥2/𝑑𝑓 =1.81; CFI = 
0.992; TLI = 0.985; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.063). For the 
convergent validity, I also obtained a high AVE (AVE = .65). 
Attainment Discrepancy Attainment Discrepancy is the same as a deviation from 
prior performance. Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel and Bierman (2010) reported that there were 
significant deviations from performance based on a board’s attention to monitoring a firm, 




“1” when the current performance was expected to be greater than past performance, and 
“0” if not.  
Firm Age.  According to life-cycle theory, organizations are similar to individuals. 
They are born, they grow, and they get old (Van de van & Poole, 1995). It is well known 
that older firms are more likely to experience pressure that requires them to be more 
conscious of their social responsibility. Although older firms are less likely to depend on 
external resources (Daily et al., 2002), it is hard for them to avoid ignoring expectations 
about social involvement because of their reputation and history (Roberts, 1992). Godos-
Díez et al. (2011) show a positive relationship between the age of a firm and its social 
involvement. 
Firm age is also related to knowledge. Older firms are more likely to have a 
greater stock of knowledge (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003). If firms are knowledgeable, it is 
reasonable to expect that they will deal with complex demands. In addition, the relative 
importance of different stakeholders will vary in accordance with an organization’s life 
cycle stage (Jawahar & Mclaughlin, 2001). Therefore, I controlled for the age of firms by 
subtracting the date of founding from 2014, which is consistent with prior research 
(Julian & Ofori-dankwa, 2013). Because of the normality concern, I log transformed the 
value.  
Ratio of Debt.  Debt is negatively related to the social involvement of a firm 
because it is a reflection of a low level of resource availability (Brammer and Millington, 
2008). Navarro (1988) argued that a high level of debt compared to equity negatively 
affects corporate giving. This is because debt decreases the discretion of managers and 




a focal firm (Barnett & Salomon, 2012), not society. Prior research has shown a negative 
relationship between a high debt-equity ratio and corporate social responsibility (CSR) or 
corporate donation (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Brammer and Millington, 2008). I 
expect that a high degree of debt will induce an organization to focus much more on 
commercial logics, which decreases the centrality of their competing institutional logics. 
Hence, I controlled the ratio of debt, measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets, which was consistent with Barnett and Salomon (2012).    
Industry. Industries have different benefits, pressures, and expectations about a 
firm’s behavior (Hitt et al., 2004; Reuer, Tong, Tyler, & Ariño, 2013). In particular, prior 
research suggested controlling for the industry effect on the socially related activities of a 
firm (Amato & Amato, 2007; Ussem, 1988; Vidaver-Cohen & Altman, 2000). For 
example, insurance and mining have different levels of public contact (Ussem, 1988). To 
control for the potential effects of industrial sectors on the centrality of competing 
institutional logics in social enterprises, I will borrow a classification of seven areas from 
a recent social entrepreneurship study (Lee & Battilana, 2013). According to Lee & 
Battilana (2013), the seven areas of social enterprises include: (1) the arts and culture, (2) 
civil and human rights, (3) economic development, (4) education, (5) the environment, (6) 
health/healthcare, and (7) public service. This classification is consistent with ones from 
the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (KSEPA). In this study, I included one 
more category “other.”  
Type. According to their activities, social enterprises have also been grouped into 
two broad categories: social service enterprises and work integration social enterprises 




identified in the real world.  For example, Green Works, started in 2000, recycles wasted 
furniture. Then, schools, small businesses, and other charities buy the recycled or 
repaired furniture from Green Works. Green Works also hires people who are not 
competitive in the market. Reflecting this reality, KSEPA classified five different types 
of social enterprises: (1) social service, (2) work integration social enterprises (WISEs), 
(3) the mixture of social service and WISEs, (4) community-based, and (5) other.  
Diversity of Board of Directors. Board members affect a firm’s strategy (Hill & 
Snell, 1988; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992).This is because of their monitoring and evaluating 
the performance of the CEO (Vance, 1983). Traditionally, they were understood as 
shareholder agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Board members who have relevant 
experience can also provide useful advice to a CEO (Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008). 
Thus, it has been argued that strategic actions can also be influenced by the experience of 
board members. For example, Golden and Zajac (2001) report there was a positive 
relationship between the proportion of board members’ business occupations and the 
levels of strategic change. In line with prior research, I controlled for diversity of board 
members using their prior experience. For computation, I used the Blau index (1977). 
The formula is 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1 , where P is the proportion of board of directors with a past 
experience category i, N is the total number of experience categories. In this study, I 
identified four categories of past experience: (1) the social sector, (2) the commercial 
sector, (3) a combination of both the social and the commercial sectors, and (4) non-
experience.  
CEO Duality. If a CEO is the chairman of the board of directors at the same time, 




power lessens the level of monitoring by board directors (Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & 
Bierman, 2010). If there is CEO duality in a social enterprise, the response to either a 
social or a commercial logic will be influenced by CEO preference. In this study, I 
controlled for CEO duality using a dummy variable, coded as “1” if CEO were the 
chairperson of the board, or “0” otherwise. 
All measures in this dissertation are summarized in Appendix A. 
Statistical Approach 
 I used ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. In 
order to test the effects of the proposed variables on centrality of competing logics, I ran 
five regression models adopting a hierarchical regression approach where I included 
independent variables in different stages. Before running the hierarchical regression 
models, assumptions were tested by examining normal probability plots of residual and 
scatter spots of residuals versus predicted residuals. No violations of normality, linearity, 
or homoscedasticity of residuals were detected. In addition, there was no evidence of 
outliers. To check for multicollinearity, I used the variation inflation factor (VIF). All 
VIFs were below 2.0, with the exception of the maximum VIF of 3.02. Therefore, 
multicollinearity was not an issue because all VIF’s fell below 10 (Belsey, Kuh, & 










Study Two: Measures, Validation, and Statistical Procedures 
Dependent Variable 
 In study two, the dependent variable was the same as for study one: the centrality 
of competing logics. 
Independent Variable  
Founder’s non-profit experience. Following the previous research (Astebro & 
Thompson, 2011; Kim & Logest, 2014), founder’s non-profit experience can be 
measured by the number of years the social entrepreneurs reported having worked in the 
non-profit sector prior to starting the current social enterprise. Respondents were asked to 
answer the question:  “how long have you had experience in non-profit sectors prior to 
your current social enterprise.” Average years of respondents are 6.79 years. 
Moderator Variables  
Ambivalent interpretation. In order to operationalize ambivalence, I asked social 
entrepreneurs to indicate their positive or negative evaluation of a recent trend through 
the use of a designed vignette. The case described the current direction of government 
policy toward social entrepreneurship, from direct financial support to indirect market-
oriented policy. I measured these trends using two items, a 7-point Likert scale each (1= 
strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree; see Appendix B for more detail).  This approach is 
consistent with prior research on the evaluation of strategic issues (Plambeck & Weber, 
2010; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990). Especially, usage of two sets of cases is consistent 




The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.78 for the positive evaluation and 0.93 for the negative 
evaluation. 
The vignette in Appendix B not only contains salient and complex recent trends 
that impact social enterprises, but it also provides the conditions for ambivalent 
evaluations. For example, the case of the current shift of policy from direct financial 
support to indirect market-based methods has both positive and negative aspects for 
social enterprises. I expect that market-based policy, such as an increase in the number of 
sales channels, will provide social enterprises with an opportunity to scale-up; however, 
social enterprises will be confronted with market-based competition because of the 
reduction in subsidies provided by the government, which prioritizes a commercial logic 
over a social-welfare logic. Table 4 lists the factor loading and Cronbach’s alpha.  
 
Table 4. Validity Assessment for Constructs of Ambivalent Interpretation
 




  Positive Interpretation
a 
Our company will benefit 
from the current trend 
described above. 
4.93 1.63 0.98*** 
The current trend described 
above comprises a potential 
gain for our company. 





The current trend described 
above is something negative 
for our company. 
2.93 1.54 0.94*** 
There is a high probability of 
losing a great deal because of 
the current trend described 
above 
3.01 1.57 0.93*** 
*Note: ª Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78, AVE= 0.69, b Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93, AVE= 0.87,                       
cStandardized Factor Loading, *** P<.001 
Then, I computed ambivalent evaluation using a similarity-intensity model (SIM), 




using designed hypothetical conditions, arguing that ambivalence is increased when the 
similarity between positive and negative is increased as well as when there is greater 
intensity for both positive and negative outcomes (Priester & Petty, 1996). The formula 
follows: A = (D+C)/2 − (D-C), 
where D is the dominant reaction and C is the conflicting reaction. For example, if a 
respondent’s evaluation of a recent trend receives a “6” for the rating of “positive” and a 
“4” for the rating of “negative”, then D = 6 and C = 4.  Ambivalence can be calculated by 
(6+4)/2 − (6-4), which equals 3.  Although there are “4” for “positive” and “6” for 
“negative,” D, C, and ambivalence score are identical to the former case. On the other 
hand, if both positive and negative evaluations are “7”, the ambivalence score becomes 
“7.” The higher the overall ambivalence score, the greater is the presence of both positive 
and negative evaluations at the same time (Plambeck & Weber, 2010; Thompson et al., 
1995).  
A social entrepreneur’s career variety.  Adopted by Crossland et al. (2013) and 
Lee and Battilana (2013), I measured a social entrepreneur’s career variety using seven 
items:  (1) the number of industries, (2) the number of organizations, (3) the number of 
functions that an entrepreneur had worked prior to becoming a social entrepreneur of the 
focal firm, (4) age, (5) total years of career experience, and (6) education level. Following 
prior research (Crossland et al., 2013), I conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
to assess convergent and discriminant validity as shown in Table 5. The results in Table 5 
are consistent with the previous study. Based on the results of EFA, I calculated career 






Table 5. Social Entrepreneur’s Career Variety: Exploratory Factor Analysis
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Number of industries .832 .002 .099 
Number of organizations .812 .146 .083 
Number of functional areas .811 -.073 -.173 
Age -.190 .865 -.181 
Career experience .338 .751 .261 
Education level -.017 -.002 .969 
 
Therefore, the final measure of a social entrepreneur’s career variety was 
computed by the sum of the number of industries, the number of organizations, and the 
number of functional areas, divided by the total years of career experience of a social 
entrepreneur. The average of the value was 1.66, ranging from 0.15 to 15. The 
Cronbach’s alpha was .76.  
Control Variables 
All control variables in study one were re-used in the study two. In addition, there 
are several additional control variables at the founder level. 
Founder Age Founder’s age can impact the centrality of competing logics in 
social enterprises. This is mainly because that it is correlated with the decision of 
strategic choice in a firm. Extant research has documented the role of a CEO’s age on a 
strategic decision (Fondas & Wiersema, 1997; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Age can 
have positive or negative impact on the organizational decisions about the use of 
institutional logics based on their preference toward risk or the pursuit of opportunities. 
Although age is associated with experience and expertise, which leads an individual to 
exploit an opportunity, at the same time, the negative relationship between an owner’s 
age and an opportunity has also been reported (Gielnik, Zacher, & Frese, 2012; Zacher & 




opportunities will decrease as the time left in one’s life diminishes. Therefore, I 
controlled for founder age by measuring years. Then, I log transformed it. 
Founder’s gender. Much anecdotal evidence suggests that there is also a positive 
relationship between women and generosity (Mesch, 2009). Despite conditional effects, 
women are likely to donate more than men (Mesch, Rooney, Steinberg, & Denton, 2006; 
Rooney, Mesch, Chin, & Steinberg, 2005) and be volunteers more than men (Einolf, 
2009). At the organizational level, most leaders who are in-charge of philanthropic 
activities are women (Conry, 1998). I dummy coded gender as “1” if a founder was male, 
and “0” if not.  
Founder’s education level. Education level may be associated with human 
capital, defined here as skills and knowledge from schooling, training, or experience 
(Becker, 1964), which possibly impact the centrality of competing logics. A founder’s 
level of education was measured by 1= high school, 2=bachelor’s degree, 3=master’s 
degree, and 4=doctoral degree. 
Prior for-profit experience. Following a previous study (Lee & Battilana, 2013), I 
computed prior for-profit experience using the total years of work experience in a 
commercial sector prior to starting the current social enterprise.   
Statistical Approach 
 In order to test the possible curvilinear relationship between a founder’s non-
profit experience and the centrality of competing logics as well as the proposed 
moderating effects of a social entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation and her/his career 
variety, which are H4, H5, and H6, respectively, I used moderated hierarchical regression 




of competing logics. Not only has hierarchical regression been widely used to access non-
linearity (Cohen et al., 2002), it has been the preferred statistical tool to identify 
moderating effects (Aguinis, 1995). In particular, management scholars have used 
moderated hierarchical regressions to detect curvilinear moderation (Baer et al., 2010, 
Lechner et al., 2010). I mean centered the variables before I squared the independent 
variable, founder’s non-profit experience, and created the interaction terms in order to 
minimize the multicollinearity problems (Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson & Richter, 2006). 
All VIF’s were below 3.0 (maximum VIF was 2.92 in this study). Therefore, 
multicollinearity was not an issue because all VIFs fell below 10 (Belsey, Kuh, & Welsch, 


















CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Study One Results 
The following chapter summarizes what I have learned through the analyses. 
Table 6 contains the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables. Table 
7 reports the results of five regression models explaining the centrality of competing 
logics, which was operationalized as the dependent variable: F(19, 171)=2.179, 
p=.005<0.01 in Model 1, F(20, 170)=2.394, p=.001 <0.01 in Model 2, F(20, 170)=2.188, 
p=.004<0.01 in Model 3, F(20, 170)=2.347, p=.002 <0.01 in Model 4, F(22, 168)=2.597, 
p=.000<0.001 in Model 5, respectively.   
Model 1 contains only the control variables. R2 for the Model 1 is .195, which 
means 19.5 % of the variance in the centrality of competing logics is predicted by the 
control variables. The R2 for the Model 2 is .220, which means 22.0% of the variance in 
the centrality of competing logics was predicted by the ratios of ethical investors to total 
investors. The inclusion of the percentage of ethical investors significantly improves the 
amount of variance explained by the model from the previous stage (∆R² = .025, p <.05). 
The results from Model 2 in Table 7 show that the coefficient of the proportion of ethical 
investors on the centrality of competing logics is positive and statistically significant (β 
= .165, p=.021 < .05). It indicates strong support for Hypothesis 1, which proposed that a 
greater portion of ethical investors would be positively associated with the centrality of 




To test hypothesis 2 with regard to the effect of the characteristics of customers 
on the centrality of competing logics, Model 3 included the proportion of customers 
motivated by reciprocity. Although Model fit is statistically significant (F(20, 170)=2.188, 
p=.004<0.01), Model 3 doesn’t represent a significant improvement over and above 
Model 1 (∆R² = .010, p >.10). The proportion of reciprocally motivated customers was 
not found to be a significant determinant of the centrality of competing logics (β = .190, 
p=.15). Therefore, hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted an increase in cross-sector workers would enhance the 
degree of centrality of competing logics in social enterprises. The result for the effect of 
the proportion of cross-sector workers on the centrality of competing logics is reported in 
Model 4 in Table 7, which yields not only a significant model fit for the data at the .001 
level, but also is a statistically significant improvement from Model 1 (∆R² = .021, p 
<.05). In Model 4, there is an evidence that the main effect of the proportion of cross-
sector workers is positive and significant (β = .157, p=.033 <.05). It provides strong 
support for hypothesis 3.  
In the final step, Model 5 included all variables in this study. I found the 
consistent support for hypothesis 1 (β = .178, p=.012 <.05) and hypothesis 3 ((β = .163, 









Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation for Study One 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Centrality of competing logics -4.61 5.41            
2 Total attention to issues 10.72 1.86  .35**           
3 Legality (dummy) .65 .48  .03  .03          
4 Firm age(ln) 1.61 .62 -.18* -.13 -.27**         
5 Prior performance 4.31 1.12  .20**  .32** -.13 -.05        
6 Attainment Discrepancy 
(dummy) .14 .35 -.12 -.10 -.04  .14
* -.01       
7 Debt ratio .00 1.00 -.07 -.02  .15* -.01 -.07 -.05      
8 Diversity of BOD  .31 .28 -.06 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.07  .17* -.08     
9 Duality (dummy) .77 .42 -.02 -.08  .24** -.15* -.04  .01  .06  .03    
10 Proportion of ethical investors .52 .43  .12  .01 -.11  .10  .01  .09 -.03  .03 -.12   
11 Proportion of reciprocally 
motivated customers .11 .22  .01 -.12  .02  .13 -.14  .02  .08  .04  .08  .01   
12 Proportion of cross-sector 
workers .23 .38  .14
* -.04 -.02 -.04 -.12 -.08  .02 -.25** -.03 -.07  .00 
13 Art & Culture (dummy) .16 .37 -.07 -.02 -.28**  .16*  .00 -.09 -.04  .06  .04  .03 -.03 
14 Civil & human rights (dummy) .00 .07 -.04  .03 -.10  .08  .00 -.03 -.05  .11 -.03  .08 -.04 
15 Economic development (dummy) .01 .12 -.00 -.01  .00  .07  .02  .07 -.03  .09 -.03  .04  .14* 
16 Education (dummy) .08 .27  .13  .05  .06 -.13 -.06 -.06 -.07 -.04 -.11  .08 -.02 
17 Environment (dummy) .18 .38 -.01 -.04  .26**  .08  .02  .00  .11 -.02  .03 -.03  .06 
18 Health/healthcare (dummy) .05 .23  .10  .04  .04 -.06 -.02  .03  .03  .04  .08 -.09  .01 
19 Public service (dummy) .08 .27  .03  .00  .06  .05  .02  .04  .10 -.07  .02  .11 -.19** 
20 Social service type (dummy) .05 .22 -.09 -.03 -.17*  .09 -.15*  .11  .05  .09 -.10 -.02 -.02 
21 Work integration type (dummy) .68 .46  .09  .03  .21** -.12  .08  .02  .04 -.01  .05 -.12 -.09 
22 Combination type (dummy) .10 .31 -.05 -.01  .01  .07 -.05  .05  .02 -.08  .03 -.04  .12 






Variables 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22   
13 Art & Culture (dummy)  .03             
14 Civil & human rights (dummy) -.04 -.03            
15 Economic development (dummy) -.05 -.05 -.01           
16 Education (dummy)  .01 -.13 -.02 -.04          
17 Environment (dummy)  .05 -.20** -.03 -.06 -.14         
18 Health/healthcare (dummy) -.02 -.10 -.02 -.03 -.07 -.11        
19 Public service (dummy) -.01 -.13 -.02 -.04 -.09 -.14 -.07       
20 Social service type (dummy)  .08  .09 -.02 -.03  .10 -.05  .05 -.07      
21 Work integration type (dummy)  .07 -.38** -.01  .08 -.20**  .17* -.07  .12 -.34**     
22 Combination type (dummy) -.11 -.01  .21** -.04  .20** -.03  .06 -.04 -.08 -.51**    




Table 7. Results of OLS Regression Model for Study One
 
 DV: Centrality of competing logics 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept -14.08(3.25)*** -15.22(3.25)*** -14.85(3.28)*** -15.36(3.27)*** -17.42(3.29)*** 
Control Variables      
   Total attention to issues 0.80(0.21)*** 0.78(0.21)*** 0.82(0.21)*** 0.81(0.21)*** 0.80(0.21)*** 
   Legality (dummy)  -0.41(0.91)  -0.28(0.90)  -0.36(0.91)  -0.34(0.90)  -0.15(0.89) 
   Firm age(ln)  -0.66(0.66)  -0.70(0.65)  -0.74(0.66)  -0.59(0.66)  -0.70(0.65) 
   Prior performance   0.44(0.36)   0.43(0.36)   0.52(0.37)   0.54(0.36)   0.61(0.36) † 
   Attainment Discrepancy (dummy)  -0.90(1.11)  -1.19(1.11)  -0.80(1.11)  -0.77(1.10)  -0.97(1.09) 
   Debt ratio  -0.51(0.42)  -0.53(0.42)  -0.56(0.42)  -0.51(0.42)  -0.57(0.41) 
   Diversity of BOD  -1.27(1.42)  -1.37(1.40)  -1.49(1.42)  -0.42(1.46)  -0.72(1.44) 
   Duality (dummy)   0.19(0.95)   0.31(0.94)   0.13(0.95)   0.22(0.94)   0.30(0.93) 
   Art & Culture (dummy)  -0.14(1.30)  -0.08(1.29)  -0.02(1.30)  -0.33(1.29)  -0.15(1.27) 
   Civil & human rights (dummy)  -1.38(5.43)  -2.38(5.38)  -0.77(5.43)  -1.59(5.37)  -2.08(5.30) 
   Economic development (dummy)  -1.74(3.70)  -1.66(3.65)  -2.72(3.75)  -1.48(3.66)  -2.36(3.66) 
   Education (dummy)   2.73(1.50)   2.42(1.49)   2.77(1.50) †   2.68(1.49) †   2.39(1.47) 
   Environment (dummy)   0.62(1.09)   0.49(1.08)   0.47(1.10)   0.46(1.09)   0.16(1.07) 
   Health/healthcare (dummy)   2.86(1.75)   3.08(1.74)   2.81(1.75)   2.77(1.74)   2.95(1.71) 
   Public service (dummy)   0.78(1.47)   0.32(1.46)   0.22(1.51)   0.79(1.45)  -0.27(1.49) 
   Social service type (dummy)  -1.24(2.02)  -1.15(2.00)  -0.96(2.03)  -1.68(2.01)  -1.30(1.99) 
   Work integration type (dummy)   0.48(1.34)   0.93(1.34)   0.76(1.35)   0.25(1.33)   1.01(1.34) 
   Combination type (dummy)  -0.93(1.66)  -0.39(1.66)  -0.97(1.66)  -0.72(1.65)  -0.18(1.63) 
   Community-based type (dummy)   2.16(2.62)   2.53(0.88)   2.70(2.64)   1.93(2.60)   2.87(2.58) 
Main Effects      
   Proportion of ethical investors     1.81(0.89)*           2.21(0.87)* 
   Proportion of reciprocal customers     2.48(1.71)    2.49(1.67) 
   Proportion of cross-sector workers        2.27(1.05)*   2.36(1.04)* 
      
F value       2.19***       2.39***       2.18***       2.35***       2.60*** 
R²       0.195       0.220       0.205       0.216       0.254 
∆R²        0.025**       0.010       0.021*       0.059** 
Mean VIF       1.35       1.35       1.35       1.35       1.35 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 




Supplemental Analysis for Study One 
I conducted several additional analyses for robustness checks. There are four main 
issues to be considered: (1) the prior centrality of competing logics, (2) a potential 
endogeneity bias, (3) a possible non normal distribution for the proportion variables, as 
well as, (4) diversities within each stakeholder group. 
Prior centrality of competing logics. I have theorized that the internal heterogeneity of 
investor, customer, and employee stakeholder groups will determine the degree of the 
centrality of competing logics within the social enterprises. Nonetheless, sometimes, the 
current level of the centrality of competing logics can be heavily influenced by the 
previous level of the centrality of competing logics. I controlled for the prior centrality of 
competing logic by incorporating labeling claims, defined as an organization’s self-
categorization either to a social side or a commercial side. Institutional scholars have 
argued that there is a strong correlation between institutional logics and its categorization 
(Thornton et al., 2012). A label would use a specific word (Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012: 159) and carry both an explicit meaning and an implicit meaning 
(Granqvist et al., 2013). A symbolic management and market categorization perspective 
argues that market labels are not only important symbolic resources, but also are used by 
executives strategically in order to satisfy stakeholder perceptions (Granqvist et al., 2013). 
Prior research on institutional logics also has emphasized how they can be linked to 
categories (Mohr & Duquenne, 1997; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Social 
enterprises can categorize themselves as either a “social organization” or as a 
“commercial company.” Therefore, I asked middle managers to indicate the extent to 




company label in the organization’s name prior to starting the business, adopted by 
Granqvist, Grodal, and Wooley (2013). The labels of both a social organization and/or a 
commercial company can be separately assessed using a one-item and 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Each label (either a social 
organization or a commercial company) is treated as an independent construct 
represented by one item. Then, I also calculated the prior centrality of competing logics 




 𝑖𝑓 𝑆 > 𝐶; 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐶 = 𝑆; 
(𝑆𝐶 − 𝐶2)
𝐿2
 𝑖𝑓 𝐶 > 𝑆,   
where S is the “social enterprise” label, C is the “commercial enterprise” label, and L is 
the total labeling. Lager absolute numbers of score represents a lower level of centrality 
for the competing institutional logics. Similarly, I reversed the absolute score of 
coefficient of imbalance of labeling by multiplying constant -100 so that a greater value 
indicates higher level of the prior centrality of competing logics. I added the prior 
centrality of competing logics and total labeling as additional control variables in Model 
6 in the Table 8. Despite of the inclusion, the significance levels of effects have remained 
essentially same. 
  Potential endogeneity bias. It is known that if an independent variable is 
associated with the error term, endogeneity may occur (Kennedy, 2003). In order to 
check for potential endogeneity, three instrumental variables are available:  (1) the 
existence of a blockholder, (2) the proportion of the largest customer’s sales, and (3) the 
number of employees, all of which were regressed. Instrumental variables should be 
correlated with endogenous variables in the first stage; whereas, they are not related to 




The existence of a blockholder may determine the proportion of ethical investors 
because ownership structure may not be dispersed evenly and is often concentrated.  
Holderness (2009) illustrated the prevalence of this trend to concentrate ownership in 96% 
of US firms, meaning that they were owned by large shareholders. I controlled for 
blockholders as a dummy coded “1” if there was an investor who owned or was expected 
to own 50% or more of the organization, and “0” if there is no investor with more than 50% 
ownership. 
If the sales of the focal organization are concentrated around a few large 
customers, the concentration can be directly associated with the proportion of a certain 
kind of customer segments, which is reciprocally motivated customers in this study. 
Hence, it can be inferred that the proportion of large customers is a considerable 
influence on the composition of customer mix in the social enterprises. Respondents were 
asked to gauge the relative proportion of their largest customer’s sales in the total sales.  
The proportion of cross-sector workers can be correlated with the number of employees. I 
calculated the number of employees as the logarithm of the number of employee.  
Then, I used two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions with the ivregress 
command in STATA 13.0.  In this additional analysis, the coefficients of the residual 
variable were not significant. Furthermore, I also conducted the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test. The result of the test suggests endogeneity is not a concern in this study (F(3,163)  
= .147571 ; p = 0.9311). In addition to the test for endogeneity bias, I treated these three 
instrumental variables as control variables. Then, I regressed these variables on the main 
equation. The results of the new regression are shown in Model 7 in Table 8. All 




Table 8. Supplementary Analysis Study One: Adding prior centrality of competing 
logics and other controls 
 DV: Centrality of competing logics 
Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept -14.39(3.47)*** -17.83(3.87)*** -15.10(3.99)*** 
Control Variables    
   Total attention to issues 0.91(0.22)*** 0.80(0.21)*** 0.91(0.22)*** 
   Legality (dummy)  -0.19(0.88)  -0.15(0.91)  -0.16(0.90) 
   Firm age(ln)  -0.79(0.64)  -0.77(0.67)  -0.84(0.67) 
   Prior performance   0.63(0.36) †   0.63(0.37) †   0.65(0.37) † 
   Attainment Discrepancy (dummy)  -0.48(1.10)  -0.92(1.11)  -0.47(1.11) 
   Debt ratio  -0.56(0.40)  -0.59(0.41)  -0.58(0.41) 
   Diversity of BOD  -0.56(1.44)  -0.76(1.45)  -0.56(1.45) 
   Duality (dummy)   0.20(0.92)   0.37(0.95)   0.23(0.94) 
   Art & Culture (dummy)  -0.01(1.26)  -0.09(1.28)   0.04(1.27) 
   Civil & human rights (dummy)  -1.56(5.24)  -1.38(5.45)  -1.05(5.39) 
   Economic development (dummy)  -1.85(3.62)  -2.47(3.71)  -1.91(3.67) 
   Education (dummy)   2.38(1.45)    2.49(1.49)    2.47(1.47)  
   Environment (dummy)   0.52(1.08)   0.13(1.08)   0.49(1.09) 
   Health/healthcare (dummy)   3.24(1.69) †   2.98(1.74) †   3.32(1.73) † 
   Public service (dummy)  -0.24(1.47)  -0.21(1.51)  -0.25(1.50) 
   Social service type (dummy)  -1.13(1.97)  -1.14(2.02)  -1.06(2.00) 
   Work integration type (dummy)   0.94(1.32)   0.97(1.35)   0.90(1.34) 
   Combination type (dummy)   0.11(1.62)  -0.30(1.67)  -0.01(1.66) 
   Community-based type (dummy)   2.34(2.56)   2.79(2.60)   2.28(2.58) 
Additional Control Variables    
   Prior centrality of competing logics    0.06(0.03) †     0.06(0.03) † 
   Total name claims   -0.36(0.17) *    -0.37(0.17) * 
   Block holder (dummy)   -0.08(0.91)    0.16(0.91) 
   Major customer’s share    0.01(0.01)    0.01(0.01) 
   Number of employees (ln)    0.20(0.46)    0.11(0.46) 
Main Effects    
   Proportion of ethical investors   2.11(0.86)*   2.16(0.88)*   2.04(0.88)* 
   Proportion of reciprocal customers   2.24(1.65)   2.55(1.71)   2.36(1.70) 
   Proportion of cross-sector workers   2.48(1.07)*   2.37(1.06)*   2.52(1.10)* 
F value       2.71
**       2.27**       2.37*** 
R²       0.28       0.26       0.28 
Mean VIF       1.38       1.36       1.39 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; *Note: Unstandardized coefficient and standard error  
 
Nonnormality of proportion variable. Third, the proportion variables may violate 




and Flinchbaugh (2013), I added a constant of one to all three independent variables. 
Then, I transformed them into natural logs. I replaced all previous independent variables 
with the new log proportion of ethical investors, reciprocally motivated customers, and 
cross-sector workers in Model 9 in Table 9. However, the Model 9 did not change the 
previous results. 
Diversities instead of proportions.  It is possible that the centrality of competing 
logics was influenced by diversity within each stakeholder group, rather than by the 
proportion of certain characteristics of the intra stakeholder groups. In order to control for 
this alternative explanation, I calculated the different independent variables. To capture 
the degree to which investments are dispersed in a social enterprise, I used Hirschman–
Herfindahl index (HHI). Following the Herfindahl Index approach (Acar & Sankaran, 
1999; Herfinhdal, 1950) and adopting the categories developed by Spiess-Knafl and 
Achleitner (2012), I created a measure of investor diversity. The formula is 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1 , 
where P is the share of investment category i of a firm, N is the total number of 
investment categories. For the diversity of customers, I identified five categories from 
objective sales sources:  (1) government, (2) for-profit organizations, (3) non-profit 
organizations, (4) other social enterprises, and (5) individual customers. Next, I 
calculated the diversity of customer groups using the same Herfindahl Index.  
In order to capture the diversity of employees, I used the same categories of 
employee background. The formula of 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1 , where P is the proportion of 
employees with a past experience category i, N is the total number of experience 
categories, was used. All previous independent variables were replaced by the new 




variables showed a significant relationship associated with the centrality of competing 
logics. 
Table 9.Supplementary Analysis Study One: Change of IVs 
 DV: Centrality of competing logics 
Variables Model 9 Model 10 
Intercept  -15.02(4.00)***  -10.98(3.90)** 
Control Variables   
   Total attention to issues     0.91(0.22)***     0.90(0.23)*** 
   Legality (dummy)    -0.16(0.90)    -0.12(0.93) 
   Firm age(ln)    -0.83(0.67)    -0.47(0.69) 
   Prior performance     0.63(0.37) †     0.55(0.37)  
   Attainment Discrepancy (dummy)    -0.49(1.11)    -0.83(1.15) 
   Debt ratio    -0.58(0.41)    -0.37(0.42) 
   Diversity of BOD    -0.66(1.45)    -1.02(1.51) 
   Duality (dummy)     0.24(0.94)     0.05(0.95) 
   Art & Culture (dummy)    -0.02(1.27)     0.40(1.33) 
   Civil & human rights (dummy)    -0.98(5.39)    -0.66(5.53) 
   Economic development (dummy)    -1.67(3.66)     0.75(3.05) 
   Education (dummy)     2.44(1.47)     2.52(1.49) † 
   Environment (dummy)     0.48(1.09)     0.44(1.12) 
   Health/healthcare (dummy)     3.31(1.73) †     2.30(1.87)  
   Public service (dummy)    -0.19(1.50)     0.09(1.48) 
   Social service type (dummy)    -1.12(2.00)    -0.48(2.04) 
   Work integration type (dummy)     0.85(1.34)     0.48(1.34) 
   Combination type (dummy)    -0.06(1.65)    -0.56(1.68) 
   Community-based type (dummy)     2.10(2.59)     1.71(2.62) 
Additional Control Variables   
   Prior centrality of competing logics     0.06(0.04) †     0.07(0.04) † 
   Total name claims    -0.37(0.17) *    -0.32(0.17) † 
   Block holder (dummy)     0.15(0.92)    -0.23(0.90) 
   Major customer’s share     0.01(0.01)     0.00(0.01) 
   Number of employees (ln)     0.10(0.46)    -0.02(0.47) 
Alternative Independent Variables   
   Log percentage of ethical investors     3.05(1.27)*  
   Log percentage of reciprocal customers     2.82(2.30)  
   Log percentage of cross-sector workers     3.57(1.57)*  
Alternative Independent Variables   
   Diversity of investors      1.30(1.38) 
   Diversity of customers     -2.86(1.75) 
   Diversity of employees     -1.47(1.71) 
F value       2.37**       1.93** 
R²       0.28       0.24 
Mean VIF       1.38       1.40 




Study Two Results 
Table 10 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in 
this study. Table11 and 12 report the results of the hierarchical regression model 
predicting the centrality of competing logics. 
Only control variables are incorporated in Model 1 in Table 11. Although a 
substantial amount of the variance in the centrality of competing logics can be explained 
by the control variables (Model 1: R2 = .206, p < 0.05), none of which is significantly 
associated with the proposed dependent variable.  
Hypothesis 4 posited that there is a curvilinear relationship between a social 
entrepreneur’s non-profit experience and the centrality of competing logics. In order to 
test a non-linear relationship as proposed in H4, I entered into Model 2 the linear and 
squared term of founder’s non-profit experience (number of years and number of years2 
in non-profit sectors). To support the hypothesized curvilinear relationship, the 
coefficient for the squared term should be positively significant on the centrality of 
competing logics. As shown in Model 2 in Table 11, there is a positive coefficient for the 
linear term for a founder’s non-profit experience (β = .268, p=.031 <.05) and a negative 
coefficient for the squared founder’s non-profit experience term (β = -.343, p=.006 <.01). 
Both terms were significant for the centrality of competing logics. R2 for Model 2 is .242, 
which means 24.2% of the variance in the centrality of competing logics was predicted 
by a founder’s non-profit experience.  In addition, a significant change in R2 from Model 
1 supports the improvement of the model (∆R² = .036, p <.05). This is consistent with the 
presence of a curvilinear relationship between a founder’s non-profit experience and the 




Table 10. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation for Study Two 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Centrality of competing logics -4.61 5.41            
2 Total attention to issues 10.72 1.86  .35**           
3 Legality (dummy) .65 .48  .03  .03          
4 Firm age(ln) 1.61 .62 -.18* -.13 -.27**         
5 Prior performance 4.31 1.12  .20**  .32** -.13 -.05        
6 Attainment Discrepancy(dummy) .14 .35 -.12 -.10 -.04  .14* -.01       
7 Debt ratio .00 1.00 -.07 -.02  .15* -.01 -.07 -.05      
8 Diversity of BOD  .31 .28 -.06 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.07  .17* -.08     
9 Duality (dummy) .77 .42 -.02 -.08  .24** -.15* -.04  .01  .06  .03    
10 Founder age (ln) 3.90 .18  .02 -.13 -.09  .03  .07  .01 -.05 -.08 -.05   
11 Founder education 3.88 1.22  .05  .07 - 17*  .03  .06 -.04  .03  .03 -.10 -.08  
12 Founder’s gender (dummy) 1.33 .47  .08  .08 - 01 -.08  .01  .06 -.13 -.09 -.03 -.02  .00 
13 Founder’s commercial 
experience (years) 6.79 6.35  .17
**  .09  .07 -.01  .05 -.05 -.07  .02  .12  .21** -.23** 
14 Founder’s non-profit experience 
(years) 5.89 5.84 -.04  .01 -.26
**  .15*  .07  .11 -.03  .02 -.18*  .07  .34** 
15 Founder’s Ambivalent 
interpretation 1.38 2.06  .17
** -.04 -.04 -.06  .02 -.05 -.02 -.08 -.04 -.19** -.06 
16 Founder’s career variety 1.66 2.26  .10  .06  .08 -.14 -.03 -.11 -.07  .15*  .09 -.21** -.11 
17 Art & Culture (dummy) .16 .37 -.07 -.02 -.28**  .16*  .00 -.09 -.04  .06  .04 -.15**  .07 
18 Civil & human rights (dummy) .00 .07 -.04  .03 -.10  .08  .00 -.03 -.05  .11 -.03 -.09  .06 
19 Economic development (dummy) .01 .12 -.00 -.01  .00  .07  .02  .07 -.03  .09 -.03 -.03  .08 
20 Education (dummy) .08      .27  .13  .05 -.06 -.13 -.06 -.06 -.07 -.04 -.11 -.11  .15* 
21 Environment (dummy) .18 .38 -.01 -.04  .26**  .08  .02  .00  .11 -.02  .03  .10 -.14* 
22 Health/healthcare (dummy) .05 .23  .10  .04  .04 -.06 -.02  .03  .03  .04  .08 -.11  .02 
23 Public service (dummy) .08 .27  .03  .00  .06  .05  .02  .04  .10 -.07  .02  .04  .03 
24 Social service type (dummy) .05 .22 -.09 -.03 -.17*  .09 -.15*  .11  .05  .09 -.10 -.10  .13 
25 Work integration type (dummy) .68 .46  .09  .03  .21** -.12  .08  .02  .04 -.01  .05 -.19** -.15* 
26 Combination type (dummy) .10 .31 -.05 -.01  .01  .07 -.05  .05  .02 -.08  .03 -.04  .10 




Variables 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13 Founder’s commercial 
experience (years) -.18
**             
14 Founder’s non-profit experience 
(years) -.13 -.18
*            
15 Founder’s ambivalent 
interpretation -.06 -.04 -.08  
         
16 Founder’s career variety  .13 -.09 -.24**  .15*          
17 Art & Culture (dummy)  .07 -.01  .02  .06  .01         
18 Civil & human rights (dummy)  .10 -.03  .03 -.12 -.02 -.03        
19 Economic development (dummy)  .00  .02  .08  .08 -.04 -.05 -.01       
20 Education (dummy)  .15*  .05  .02  .06  .12 -.13 -.02 -.04      
21 Environment (dummy) -.19**  .10 -.12  .04 -.00 -.20** -.03 -.06 -.14     
22 Health/healthcare (dummy)  .16* -.01 -.01 -.02 -.04 -.10 -.02 -.03 -.07 -.11    
23 Public service (dummy) -.05  .01 -.05 -.07 -.02 -.13 -.02 -.04 -.09 -.14 -.07   
24 Social service type (dummy) -.06 -.10  .18** -.06 -.09  .09 -.02 -.03  .10 -.05  .05 -.07  
25 Community-based type (dummy)  .03  .02 -.15*  .05  .04 -.38** -.10  .08 -.20**  .17* -.07  .12 -.34** 
26 Combination type (dummy) -.18**  .07 -.00  .05 -.10 -.01  .21** -.04  .20** -.03  .06 -.04 -.08 
27 Community-based type (dummy) -.13  .17*  .08 -.14 -.04  .00 -.01 -.02 -.05 -.08 -.04  .06 -.04 
Variables 25 26            
26 Combination type (dummy) -.51**             





Table 11. Results of OLS Hierarchical Regression Model for Study Two 
 DV: Centrality of competing logics 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept      -19.71(10.50)**  -24.81(10.56)** 
Control Variables   
  Total attention to issues          0.83(0.23)***     0.84(0.23)*** 
   Legality a         -0.08(0.97)    -0.13(0.96) 
   Firm age(ln)         -0.85(0.69)    -0.99(0.68) 
   Prior performance          0.31(0.38)     0.29(0.37)  
   Attainment Discrepancy a         -0.83(1.16)    -1.28(1.17) 
   Debt ratio         -0.31(0.40)    -0.28(0.40) 
   Diversity of BOD         -0.85(1.51)    -0.61(1.48) 
   Duality a         -0.13(1.00)     0.24(0.99) 
   Founder age (ln)          0.92(2.48)     2.41(2.51) 
   Founder education          0.34(0.35)     0.26(0.36) 
   Founder gender a          0.47(0.92)     0.86(0.93) 
   Founder’s commercial exp (yrs)          0.12(0.07) †     0.14(0.07) * 
   Art & Culture a         -0.02(1.38)    -0.01(1.35) 
   Civil & human rights a         -1.18(5.74)    -2.60(5.66) 
   Economic development a          0.65(3.17)     0.48(3.12) 
   Education a          2.15(1.67)     2.23(1.64) 
   Environment a          0.67(1.15)     0.36(1.14) 
   Health/healthcare a          2.73(1.86)     2.15(1.84)  
   Public service a          0.99(1.51)     0.66(1.50) 
   Social service type a         -1.22(2.08)    -1.09(2.05) 
   Work integration type a          0.21(1.40)     0.49(1.38) 
   Combination type a         -1.43(1.75)    -1.10(1.73) 
   Community-based type a         -1.43(2.64)    -0.74(2.62) 
Main Effects   
   Founder’s non-profit exp (yrs)      1.56(0.72) * 
   Founder’s non-profit exp (yrs) ²     -1.25(0.45) ** 
   
F value 1.88*        2.01** 
R² 0.206        0.242 
∆R²         0.036* 
Mean VIF 1.38        1.56 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Note: Unstandardized coefficient and standard error;                                








Table 12. Results of OLS Hierarchical Regression Model for Study Two 
 DV: Centrality of competing logics 
Variables Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept -31.72(10.65)*** -30.28(10.56)*** -32.55(10.67)*** 
Control Variables    
 Total attention to issues     0.86(0.22)***     0.91(0.22)***     0.87(0.22)*** 
 Legality a     0.13(0.94)    -0.08(0.94)     0.12(0.95) 
 Firm age(ln)    -0.80(0.67)    -0.61 (0.67)    -0.69(0.68) 
 Prior performance     0.30(0.37)      0.18(0.37)      0.24(0.37)  
 Attainment Discrepancy a    -1.00(1.15)    -0.94(1.14)    -1.14(1.16) 
 Debt ratio    -0.23(0.39)    -0.18(0.39)    -0.14(0.40) 
 Diversity of BOD    -0.68(1.49)    -0.71(1.47)    -0.76(1.49) 
 Duality a     0.42(0.98)     0.55(0.97)     0.56(0.99) 
 Founder age (ln)     3.84(2.51)     3.41(2.50)     3.98(2.52) 
 Founder education     0.37(0.36)     0.38(0.36)     0.36(0.36) 
 Founder gender a     1.00(0.92)     0.97(0.91)     1.09(0.93) 
 Founder’s commercial exp (yrs)     0.15(0.07) *     0.15(0.07) *     0.16(0.07) * 
 Art & Culture a    -0.27(1.34)    -0.53(1.33)    -0.37(1.34) 
 Civil & human rights a    -0.29(5.63)    -3.10(5.74)    -0.61(5.63) 
 Economic development a    -0.16(3.08)    -0.46(3.05)    -0.11(3.09) 
 Education a     1.82(1.62)     1.90(1.61)     1.69(1.64) 
 Environment a     0.19(1.12)     -0.04(1.12)     0.07(1.13) 
 Health/healthcare a     2.27(1.82)     1.95(1.80)      2.15(1.82)  
 Public service a     0.70(1.48)     0.27(1.47)     0.50(1.49) 
 Social service type a    -0.72(2.03)    -1.17(2.02)    -0.93(2.04) 
 Work integration type a     0.19(1.37)     0.45(1.37)     0.12(1.38) 
 Combination type a    -1.50(1.73)    -0.92(1.73)    -1.62(1.73) 
 Community-based type a    -0.16(2.58)    -0.11(2.55)    -0.43(2.59) 
Main Effects    
 Founder’s non-profit exp (yrs)     1.63(0.71) *     1.68(0.70) *     1.73(0.72) * 
 Founder’s non-profit exp (yrs) ²    -1.22(0.44) **    -1.22(0.44) **    -0.95(0.50) † 
 Ambivalent Interpretation     1.01(0.41) * 0.04(0.59)     0.88(0.42) *  
 Career Variety     0.42(0.42) 0.31(0.42)    -0.38(0.80)  
Interaction Effects    
 Non-profit exp (yrs)× Ambivalent  -0.85(0.67)  
 Non-profit exp (yrs)²× Ambivalent  0.89(0.41)*  
 Non-profit exp (yrs) × Career Variety      -0.42(0.84)   
 Non-profit exp (yrs)²× Career Variety       1.07(0.76)  
F value        2.31
** 2.47*** 2.22** 
R²        0.278 0.303 0.29 
∆R²        0.036
* 0.025* 0.009 b 
Mean VIF        1.57 1.87 1.90 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Note: Unstandardized coefficient and standard error;                              





The curvilinear relationship between founder’s non-profit experience and the centrality of 
competing logics is plotted as Figure 4.  
Figure 4. Impact of founder’s non-profit experience on the centrality of competing 
logics 
 
I expected the curvilinear effects of a founder’s non-profit experience on the 
centrality of competing logics would depend on the different levels of a social 
entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation and career variety. Model 3 in Table 12, thus, 
adds an ambivalent interpretation and career variety as moderators. Results for the direct 
effects of ambivalent interpretation are significant, while those for career variety are non-
significant.  Following previous research (Aiken &West, 1991; Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
Cohen & Cohen, 1983), I added linear and quadratic-by-linear interactions of founder’s 
non-profit experience and ambivalent interpretation in Model 4 in Table 12, as specified 
in Hypothesis 5. F-tests on the changes in R2 indicate that the inclusion of the interaction 
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The interaction term of an ambivalent interpretation × a founder’s non-profit experience ² 
is positive and significant (β = .344, p = .032 < .05), indicating that a founder’s high 
degree of ambivalent interpretation strengthens the positive effects of low-to moderate 
levels of founder’s non-profit experience, while reduces the negative effects of moderate 
to high levels of founder’s non-profit experience on the centrality of competing logics. 
Thus, Hypothesis 5 was supported. In order to demonstrate how ambivalent interpretation 
moderates the focal curvilinear relationship, Figure 5 shows that the curvilinear 
relationship between founders’ non-profit experience and the centrality of competing 
logics in their social enterprises is much less profound for those with high, as opposed to 
low, ambivalent interpretations. 
Figure 5. Impact of founder’s non-profit experience on the centrality of competing 
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Specifically, Figure 5 reveals that both the positive and negative slopes of the 
relationship between a founders’ non-profit experience and the centrality of competing 
logics are steeper for social enterprises with social entrepreneurs whose ambivalent 
interpretation is low. One the other hand, the curve becomes relatively flat at a high 
degree of ambivalent interpretation. The moderation effects of ambivalent interpretation 
are in the predicted direction in Hypothesis 5, which proposed that the curvilinear 
relationship between a level of non-profit experience of founders and the centrality of 
competing institutional logics will be weaker for the social enterprises with a more 
ambivalent social entrepreneur.  
Finally, I entered the linear and quadratic-by-linear interactions of founder’s non-
profit experience and career variety in Model 5 in Table 12. Hypothesis 6 predicted that 
the curvilinear relationship between a founder’s non-profit experience and the centrality 
of competing logics would be less profound with a high level of a social entrepreneur’s 
career variety. Although the direction of the effect would be in the hypothesized direction, 












Supplemental Analysis for Study Two 
To check the robustness of the findings, I conducted two additional analyses First, 
I controlled for the prior centrality of competing logics by re-using the coefficient of 
imbalance of labeling claims and the total labeling score. With additional control 
variables, I re-ran the whole analyses. Although these two control variables were 
significant through Model 6 to Model 8 in Table 13, I found no change in the results. 
Second, I conducted regressions with a founder’s for-profit experience as an 
alternative independent variable. This is quite important because recent research suggests 
that a founder’s for-profit experience has a non-linear effect on the hybridity of the social 
enterprises. In the sample of 700 social venture founders, Lee and Battilana (2013) show 
that a social venture’s level of incorporating competing logics increases as the founder’s 
for-profit experience increases. After an average 22 years of for-profit experience, 
however, it is negatively associated with the hybridity. Therefore, I replaced a founder’s 
non-profit experience with for-profit experience. Then, I re-ran the regressions from 
Model 9 to Model 12 in Table 14. However, I did not find significant relationship 










Table 13. Supplementary Analysis for Study Two: Adding prior centrality
 
 DV: Centrality of competing logics 
Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept -17.35(10.62) -22.80(10.78) * -24.95(10.89) * 
Control Variables    
 Total attention to issues     0.90(0.23)***     0.97(0.23)***     0.93(0.23)*** 
 Legality a    -0.16(0.94)    -0.17(0.93)     0.04(0.94) 
 Firm age(ln)    -1.01(0.67)    -0.68(0.67)    -0.75(0.67) 
 Prior performance     0.31(0.37)      0.21(0.36)      0.26(0.37)  
 Attainment Discrepancy a    -0.80(1.15)    -0.56(1.13)    -0.75(1.15) 
 Debt ratio    -0.28(0.39)    -0.19(0.38)    -0.16(0.39) 
 Diversity of BOD    -0.59(1.46)    -0.70(1.46)    -0.77(1.48) 
 Duality a     0.21(0.97)     0.47(0.96)     0.49(0.97) 
 Founder age (ln)     1.40(2.47)     2.36(2.49)     2.90(2.52) 
 Founder education     0.13(0.36)     0.26(0.35)     0.24(0.36) 
 Founder gender a     1.16(0.91)     1.18(0.90)     1.30(0.91) 
 Founder’s commercial exp (yrs)     0.15(0.07) *     0.16(0.07) *    -0.17(0.07) * 
 Art & Culture a     0.07(1.32)    -0.39(1.31)    -0.23(1.32) 
 Civil & human rights a    -2.40(5.54)    -3.23(5.66)    -0.81(5.55) 
 Economic development a     1.09(3.06)     0.24(3.01)     0.59(3.06) 
 Education a     2.10(1.61)     1.86(1.59)     1.65(1.62) 
 Environment a     0.85(1.13)      0.41(1.11)      0.53(1.12)  
 Health/healthcare a     2.25(1.81)     2.08(1.78)     2.26(1.80) 
 Public service a     0.69(1.47)     0.28(1.45)     0.51(1.47) 
 Social service type a    -0.55(2.02)    -0.74(2.01)    -0.50(2.02) 
 Work integration type a     0.61(1.35)     0.63(1.35)     0.31(1.36) 
 Combination type a    -0.64(1.71)    -0.39(1.74)    -1.08(1.73) 
 Community-based type a    -0.72(2.56)     0.02(2.51)    -0.50(2.55) 
Additional Control Variables    
 Prior Centrality     0.09(0.03) **     0.08(0.03) *     0.08(0.03) * 
 Total name claims    -0.38(0.17) *    -0.35(0.17) *    -0.34(0.17) * 
Main Effects    
 Founder’s non-profit exp (yrs)     1.66(0.71) *     1.80(0.71) *     1.84(0.73) * 
 Founder’s non-profit exp (yrs) ²    -1.24(0.44) **    -1.24(0.44) **    -0.96(0.50) † 
 Ambivalent Interpretation     -0.12(0.58)      0.70(0.42) † 
 Career Variety      0.31(0.41)     -0.35(0.79) 
Interaction Effects    
 Non-profit exp (yrs)× Ambivalent     -0.82(0.67)   
 Non-profit exp (yrs) ²× Ambivalent      0.86(0.41) *  
 Non-profit exp (yrs) × Career Variety      -0.37(0.83) 
 Non-profit exp (yrs) ²× Career Variety       1.05(0.75) 
F value        2.38
***        2.54***       2.37*** 
R²        0.28        0.333        0.318 
Mean VIF        1.58        1.87        1.88 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Note: Unstandardized coefficient and standard error;                              





Table 14.Supplementary Analysis for Study Two: Change of IV to For-profit Exp 
 DV: Centrality of competing logics 
Variables Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Intercept -16.14(11.07)  -22.07(11.27) † -22.15(11.33) † -24.33(11.53) * 
Control Variables     
 Total attention to issues    0.92(0.24)***    0.93(0.23)***    0.97(0.24)***    0.96(0.24)*** 
 Legality a   -0.05(0.96)   -0.16(0.95)    0.15(0.97)    0.22(0.97) 
 Firm age(ln)   -0.91(0.68)   -0.75(0.68)   -0.72(0.68)   -0.79(0.68) 
 Prior performance    0.36(0.37)     0.35(0.37)     0.30(0.39)     0.35(0.37)  
 Attainment Discrepancy a   -0.23(1.16)   -0.11(1.16)   -0.12(1.16)   -0.17(1.18) 
 Debt ratio   -0.30(0.40)   -0.27(0.39)   -0.29(0.40)   -0.24(0.40) 
 Diversity of BOD   -0.82(1.48)   -0.82(1.50)   -0.86(1.51)   -0.77(1.50) 
 Duality a   -0.22(0.98)   -0.04(0.98)   -0.05(0.98)   -0.06(0.98) 
 Founder age (ln)    0.97(2.54)    2.12(2.57)    2.16(2.58)    2.54(2.62) 
 Founder education    0.29(0.37)    0.37(0.36)    0.36(0.37)    0.42(0.37) 
 Founder gender a    0.79(0.92)    0.89(0.92)    0.85(0.93)    0.94(0.93) 
 Founder’s non-profit exp (yrs)    0.03(0.07)     0.04(0.08)     0.04(0.08)    0.05(0.08) * 
 Art & Culture a    0.22(1.35)    0.04(1.35)   -0.11(1.36)   -0.02(1.35) 
 Civil & human rights a   -1.22(5.61)    0.67(5.62)    0.41(5.66)    0.62(5.64) 
 Economic development a    0.69(3.13)    0.15(3.12)    0.27(3.14)    0.08(3.13) 
 Education a    2.21(1.64)    1.90(1.64)    1.86(1.65)    1.82(1.64) 
 Environment a    1.17(1.14)     0.97(1.13)     1.01(1.17)     0.89(1.17)  
 Health/healthcare a    2.63(1.84)    2.72 (1.81)    2.76(1.84)    2.65(1.83) 
 Public service a    1.01(1.49)    1.04(1.48)    1.15(1.50)    1.18(1.49) 
 Social service type a   -0.51(2.05)   -0.34(2.05)   -0.43(2.06)   -0.39(2.05) 
 Work integration type a    0.25(1.37)    0.02(1.37)   -0.08(1.38)   -0.26(1.40) 
 Combination type a   -1.09(1.74)   -1.49(1.75)   -1.59(1.77)   -1.69(1.77) 
 Community-based type a   -1.08(2.60)   -0.65(2.58)   -0.46(2.63)   -0.77(2.59) 
Additional Control Variables     
 Prior Centrality    0.09(0.04) *    0.08(0.04) *    0.08(0.04) *    0.07(0.04) † 
 Total name claims   -0.32(0.18) †   -0.28(0.17)    -0.29(0.18)    -0.25(0.18) 
Main Effects-for-profit exp(yrs)     
 Founder’s for-profit exp (yrs)    1.57(0.62) *    1.52(0.61) *    1.55(0.62) *    1.61(0.62) * 
 Founder’s for-profit exp (yrs) ²   -0.80(0.50)    -0.68(0.50)   -0.66(0.52)   -0.69(0.51) 
 Ambivalent Interpretation     0.85(0.42) *    0.49(0.69)    0.88(0.42) * 
 Career Variety     0.27(0.42) †    0.30(0.42)    0.01(0.49) 
Interaction Effects     
 Founder’s for-profit exp (yrs) × 
 Ambivalent Interpretation   
  -0.26(0.42)  
 Founder’s for-profit exp (yrs) ²× 
 Ambivalent Interpretation   
   0.36(0.53)  
 Founder’s for-profit exp (yrs) × 
 Career Variety 
     -0.47(0.68) 
 Founder’s for-profit exp (yrs) ² × 
 Career Variety 
      0.55(0.55) 
F value   1.96**    2.181**    2.035**    2.068** 
R² 0.260 0.283 0.285 0.289 
Mean VIF 1.53 1.73 1.73 1.59 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Note: Unstandardized coefficient and standard error;                              




CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
Because social enterprises differ from both traditional for-profit and non-profit 
organizations with regard to their pursuit of a dual mission: a social mission and a 
commercial mission, the question of “why some social enterprises are more successful in 
incorporating these competing missions than others” has attracted the attention of 
scholars for several years (Dacin, Dacin, Matear. 2010; Doherty, Haugh, & Lyon, 2014). 
Nonetheless, research addressing the conditions under which social enterprises are likely 
to achieve dual missions is relatively recent and, as such, is still establishing its basic 
tenets. Thus, the variations in a social enterprise’s dual mission achievement require 
consideration of the organizational or individual factors that can impact centrality, which 
refers to the degree to which multiple logics are relevant for organizational functioning 
(Besharov & Smith, 2014, p.375). This dissertation does not only attempt to propose the 
validated measure of the centrality of competing logics, but also specifies some of 
conditions under which a social enterprise’s centrality of competing logics rises and falls.  
My effort to study empirically any variations in the centrality of competing logics 
in the field of social entrepreneurship has been limited because the conceptual construct 
of the centrality of competing logics is just emerging in institutional logics scholarship 
(Besharov & Smith, 2014). In addition, many scholars believe that social enterprises 
should achieve a high degree of centrality (Austin et al., 2006; Lumpkin et al., 2013). To 
date, research has lacked measures for centrality, which suggests a reason that there has 




the field of social entrepreneurship. Based on the assumption of value neutrality, on the 
other hand, I aimed to propose and test a validated instrument to capture the centrality of 
competing logics in social enterprises. First, I reviewed analogous constructs and theories 
to refine the components of the centrality of competing logics. Second, I assessed the 
main components of a social enterprise’s centrality: top management’s attention to issues 
associated with a social welfare logic and a commercial logic. Third, I calculated the 
centrality of competing logics by computing a reversed absolute score for the coefficient 
of imbalance. A greater score represents a higher level of centrality. Fourth, drawing on a 
survey from social enterprises in South Korea, I conducted several tests for the reliability 
and validity of the instrument. It not only demonstrates that the proposed measure of the 
centrality of competing logics is reliable, but also indicates that two dimensions – a social 
welfare logic and a commercial logic – of the centrality of competing logics are different 
from each other empirically. 
The purpose of study1 in this dissertation was to understand how the centrality of 
competing logics has been affected by the heterogeneity within each stakeholder. I 
proposed that social enterprises with an investor stakeholder group (or shareholder group), 
which is rich in ethical investors (H1), customer stakeholder groups, which are rich in 
reciprocally motivated customers (H2), and employee stakeholder groups, which are rich 
in cross-sector workers (H3) would enhance the centrality of their competing logics to a 
greater extent than those for each stakeholder groups lacking in ethical investors, 
reciprocally motivated customers, and cross-sector workers. Based on the assumption that 
financial return expectations, buying motivations, and background experiences are 




independent variable. The empirical results indicated that the higher portion of investors 
without financial return expectations was positively associated with the centrality of 
competing logics. This means the greater the portion of ethical investors positively 
influences the centrality of competing logics, which supports my first hypothesis. A 
similar result was generated from the test for the third hypothesis. I found social 
enterprises that were a higher percentage of cross-sector-workers to be more likely to 
have greater levels of the centrality of competing logics. However, the results do not 
support for the effects of customers motivated by reciprocity on centrality of competing 
logics. A possible explanation of this insignificant result would be that consumption itself 
might not be the important factor in social entrepreneurship with respect to the centrality 
of competing logics. Social problems with which social entrepreneurs can play a role in 
dealing might be the results of negative externalities – negative side effects – of 
production processes, not the results of consumption. (Coase, 1960; Scheuerle & 
Münscher 2013). 
The main objective of the study 2 was to identify the relevant dimensions of 
social entrepreneurs and empirically show their effects on the centrality of competing 
logics. I argued for the possibility of a curvilinear relationship between social 
entrepreneurs’ non-profit experience and the centrality of competing logics (H4). 
Additionally, I hypothesized that a founder’s ambivalent interpretation (H5) and career 
variety (H6) would play a moderating role in the proposed curvilinear relationship. 
Empirical findings demonstrated that social entrepreneurs’ non-profit experience has a 
positive influence on the centrality of competing logics until reaching a certain point, 




social entrepreneurs’ non-profit experience on the centrality of competing logics is less 
profound in the social enterprises with a highly ambivalent founder. These results are 
consistent with the hypotheses. However, I did not find support for the moderating effect 
of career variety on social entrepreneurs. Initially, I predicted that the benefits or 
obstacles of social entrepreneurs’ non-profit experience on the centrality of competing 
logics would be less profound in social enterprises with a founder who has a various 
career paths; however, the data suggests that career variety – various professional and 
institutional experiences – is relatively unimportant as a moderating mechanism on the 
relationship between founder’s non-profit experience and the centrality of competing 
logics. Next, I describe specific theoretical and practical contributions, followed by their 
interpretations. 
Implications for Theory and Research 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several ways. First and foremost, 
this dissertation made a contribution by developing and testing a measure for the 
centrality of competing logics in a social entrepreneurship context. Recent research has 
called for easily assessed measures for social entrepreneurship’s specific variables. For 
example, Short et al. (2009) suggest that there are chances to advance the literature of 
social entrepreneurship by providing relevant measures. This dissertation presents a 
validated and reliable measure for the centrality of competing logics. It can facilitate 
future research on examining the antecedents and consequences of the centrality of 
competing logics in social entrepreneurship context. The proposed operationalization of 
the centrality of competing logics allows us to access and administer the data collection 




Second, this dissertation provides empirical evidence to the literature by 
collecting and analyzing large-scale data. Although social entrepreneurship has received 
much scholarly attention, the criticism has also been raised because relatively few studies 
have been devoted to an analytic, detailed examination of social entrepreneurship through 
hypotheses testing with quantitative data. According to Short et al. (2009), only two 
papers out of 152 social entrepreneurship articles in their review were engaged in setting 
forth operational hypotheses and testing them rigorously. More empirical studies have 
been called for (Diochon 2010; Haugh 2012). Additionally, empirical research has been 
focusing more on the non-profit context; whereas, the for-profit context has not been 
studied extensively (Dees, 1998). With the hand-collected data from the survey of both 
non-for-profit and for-profit social enterprises, I theorized and tested a number of 
hypotheses regarding not only the direct effects of heterogeneity of intra stakeholders, but 
also the curvilinear effects of social entrepreneurs’ non-profit experience on the centrality 
of competing logics. Moreover, I found and confirm the moderating effects of social 
entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation.  
Third, this research advances the literature on social entrepreneurship by 
analyzing social entrepreneurship through the lens of institutional logic. Due to the 
concern about coping with organizational complexity in organizations, institutional 
theorists have started employing a concept of “institutional logic” to institutional theory 
(i.e. Friedland and Alford, 1991; c.f., Greenwood et al., 2011). As a result, social 
enterprises have recently been recognized as organizations located in the field where two 
competing institutional logics co-exist preeminently. Furthermore, scholars have defined 




(Wry, Lousbury, & Jennigs, 2014: 1327). Based on the notion of competing logics inside 
social enterprises as hybrid-organizations, previous studies have identified a “pattern of 
incorporating competing logics” (Pache & Santos, 2013) or “coordinating mechanism” 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana et al., 2014; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Jarzabkowski et 
al., 2009; Lounsbury, 2007). However, to date, there is a paucity of research on what 
makes the differential degrees to which these two competing logics – social welfare logic 
and commercial logic – are each treated as equally valid, which is the centrality of 
competing logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014). Therefore, this dissertation helps to provide 
evidence on the conditions under which the centrality of competing logics is higher or 
lower.  
Fourth, my dissertation also enriches the literature on the institutional theory and 
institutional logics by answering the call for rigorous investigation on identifying the 
factors that impact on the centrality of competing logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014). 
Previously, institutional theorists expected that variations in the centrality of competing 
logics is dependent upon the resource dependence at the organization level as well as 
members’ adherence of particular logic at the individual level (Besharov & Smith, 2014). 
Building on the resource dependence proposition, the first study of this dissertation 
hypothesized and showed that subgroups within stakeholders may differentiate the social 
enterprises’ dependencies upon the critical resources, which plays a significant role in 
shaping the centrality of competing logics. In the second study of this dissertation, 
following member’s adherence of particular logic proposition, I was able to discern 




centrality of competing logics by adopting social entrepreneurs’ previous work 
experience in non-profit sector as the adherence of social welfare logics.   
Fifth, this dissertation can contribute to the organizational ambidexterity literature. 
In fact, institutional logics scholars also have argued that competing logics are equivalent 
to the idea of the trade-off activities inherent in exploitation and exploration (Greenwood 
et al., 2011: 351). According to organizational theory, ambidextrous organizations’ 
simultaneously pursuit of exploitation for improving and refining products/services to 
meet the demands of existing markets (cf. Mueller, Rosenbusch, & Bausch, 2013: 1610; 
Benner & Tushman, 2003) as well as exploration for new knowledge, search, 
experimentation, and innovation (March, 1991). Scholars in this stream have focused 
much more on organizational structure as a key to incorporating competing activities than 
they have on the role of people inside organizations (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 2004; 
Siggelkow, 2003; Smith & Tushman, 2005, see Smets, Jarzabkowski, Buke & Spe, 2015). 
This dissertation, therefore, provides evidence on how the incorporation of competing 
logics can be enhanced by the individual dimensions such as founders and cross-sector 
workers.  
Sixth, specifically, the first study contributes to the literature by integrating a 
social entrepreneurship and an intra-stakeholder perspective. Building on the 
heterogeneity in intra-stakeholder group (Winn, 2001), the findings revealed that the 
heterogeneity within stakeholders can play a role in shaping the degree of centrality of 
competing logics. Specifically, ethical investors within investor stakeholders and cross-
workers within employee stakeholder may enhance the centrality of competing logics. 




in social entrepreneurship.” Scholars in the field of social entrepreneurship have 
emphasized on the larger number of diverse stakeholders (Lumpkin et al., 2013). From 
the concept of heterogeneity intra stakeholder – different sub-groups within each 
stakeholder – this study, therefore, allow us to understand different needs from diverse 
stakeholders and confirm the existence of the heterogeneity within-group stakeholders. In 
addition, it is proved that the direct effects of subgroups of intra stakeholders on the 
centrality of competing logics inside social enterprises. For example, the empirical 
findings not only describe investor stakeholders have a varying degree of financial return 
expectations, but also shows how the greater portion of investor without financial return 
expectations can increase the centrality of competing logics. 
Finally, the second study integrates an imprinting perspective and institutional 
logic. An imprinting perspective provides a theoretical foundation for assuming that there 
is a long lasting effect of individual founders on process, structures, or strategic decisions 
of his/her organization (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). The dissertation identifies the 
founder’s non-profit experience as a significant imprinting effect on the centrality of 
competing logics inside social enterprises. I found that social enterprises in which a 
founder’s non-profit work experience was higher would be more likely to incorporate 
competing institutional logics. Interestingly, the relationship between the years of a 
founder’s non-profit work experience and the centrality of competing institutional logics 
is a curvilinear, which means that an increase in a founder’s prior non-profit work 
experience will enhance the centrality only up to a certain point. Beyond that point, a 
founder’s prior non-profit work experience will decrease the centrality. In addition, the 




entrepreneur’s ambivalent interpretation.  In other words, the curvilinear effects of social 
entrepreneur’s non-profit experience are less profound in the social enterprises with high 
level of social entrepreneurs’ ambivalent interpretation.  
Implication for Practice 
This dissertation offers several implications for practitioners. First, monitoring the 
characteristics within each stakeholder groups has been extensively advised in the field of 
management (Kassins & Vafeas, 2006). This dissertation also suggests that careful 
consideration of stakeholder characteristics can play a role in incorporating competing 
logics in social enterprises. Specifically, the findings of the first study indicate that 
financial return expectations and background experiences are heterogeneous in investor 
stakeholders and employee stakeholders, respectively. Moreover, I found that the greater 
proportion of investors whose financial return expectations are low and employees who 
have cross-sector work experience enable social enterprises to incorporate competing 
logics. At the practical level, the results implicitly suggest that attracting those investors 
and employees to each stakeholder group might be beneficial to incorporating competing 
logics.  
Second, this study demonstrates the role of social entrepreneurs in shaping the 
centrality of competing logics. People who desire to be a social entrepreneur should be 
aware that non-profit experience enhances the centrality of competing logics in a social 
enterprise; however, it has the too-much-of-a-good-thing effect (TMGT effect, Pierce & 
Aguinis, 2013) of non-profit experience. Too much working in non-profit sector can limit 
one’s ability to incorporate both a social mission and a commercial mission. Practitioners, 




much time spent in the non-profit sector before starting their social enterprises might 
prioritize social welfare logic over commercial logic, instead of achieving dual 
commitment. It can be further interpreted that excessive time spent in non-profit sector 
might increase nonprofit worker identity more than entrepreneurial identity, which 
decreases “optimal identity distinctiveness.” For example, Brewer (1991) suggests the 
model of “optimal distinctiveness,” which proposes “being the same and different at the 
same time.” According to Brewer and her colleague (Brewer & Pickett, 1999), optimal 
distinctiveness in identity can be described as “a state of being neither too 
distinct/independent nor too inclusive/dependent in relation to a given social identity 
(Kreiner, Hollensbe, Sheep, 2006: 1033). From this perspective and the results, it is 
important for social entrepreneurs to spend appropriate amounts of time in non-profit 
sector in order to be neither too social nor too commercial. 
Third, this dissertation allows practitioners to understand the importance of the 
cognitive capabilities for the effective management of social enterprises, which is an 
ambivalent interpretation. I found the moderating role of a social entrepreneur’s 
ambivalent interpretation, suggesting that when social entrepreneurs’ ambivalent 
interpretation is high, the curvilinear relationship between a founder’s non-profit 
experience and the centrality of competing logics is less profound. The importance of an 
ambivalent interpretation is consistent with “paradoxical leader behavior” (Zhang, 
Waldman, Han, & Li, forthcoming). Recently, Zhang et al. (forthcoming) demonstrate 
that managers who engage in holistic thinking and have integrative complexity are more 
likely to enhance proficiency, adaptively, and proactivity. Therefore, cultivating an 




Limitations and Future Research 
 Although this dissertation has advanced our knowledge of social entrepreneurship, 
it is not without limitations, which raises possibilities for future research as well. First, 
the dissertation primarily used the cross-sectional survey design. Therefore, any 
conclusions with regard to causality will be limited from an empirical point. For example, 
there is a possibility that the high degree of centrality of competing logics at time 1 might 
attract the additional investors whose financial expectations are low at time 2, which 
results in a reverse causality concern. Although I have used 1 year lagged variables by 
asking respondents to provide both the current and 1 year lagged information, it suggests 
future research to conduct longitudinal designs to ensure the causal relationship.   
 Second, because of the extreme difficulty of collecting objective data in the field 
of social entrepreneurship, the data in this dissertation basically consist of “self-reported” 
disclosures, which can be potentially associated with recall bias and social desirability 
bias. I argue that these concerns are minimal in this study because several remedies 
already have been applied. For example, following the suggestions of previous research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), respondents were asked to “go back in time (Miller, Cardinal, & 
Glick, 1997)” and remind them of facts, not their opinion in time. Then, they reported the 
objective information such as the number of employees. In addition, similarly to previous 
research (Monteiro, forthcoming); I made respondents aware that the data would be 
aggregated, reviewed by only me, and used for research purposes only. In order to avoid 
social desirability bias in self-reported data, I also followed the suggestion of multiple 
informants (Kumar, Stern & Anderson, 1993). After collecting independent variables and 




dependent variable data. Nonetheless, the dissertation suggests that future research can 
benefit from more objective data sources, or different approaches such as natural 
experiments or simulation methods. 
Third, although usage of accredited Korean social enterprises not only makes it 
possible to conduct large-scale empirical analysis, but also allows us to avoid the 
identification problem of social entrepreneurship, I acknowledge this dissertation is 
conducted in a single country. In terms of the generalizability of my results, it is possible 
that the results of this research were not separated from the effects of government-driven 
policy in the Korean context. From replicating the proposed models in other country 
contexts, future research might not only establish the generalizability, but also find more 
interesting role of different public authorities.         
 Forth, this dissertation treated the centrality of competing logics as the dependent 
variable only. It is because the purpose of this dissertation is focusing on antecedents of 
the centrality of competing logics. Because it is beyond the scope of the research, I do not 
make any claims that achieving a high level of centrality is superior because a high level 
of the centrality can be also a source of internal conflicts. Hence, the centrality of 
competing logics can be used as independent variable for other important dependent 
variables such as social impacts, social or commercial performance, internal conflicts, 
and innovation. Furthermore, there may be different usages of the centrality of competing 
logics based on the interests of future researchers. In some cases, scholars can use the 
centrality of competing logics as a moderator or a mediator. 
 Fifth, beyond investor, customer, and employees, there are many different types 




2007), government (Nicholls & Pharoah, 2007), and fellowship organizations such as 
Ashoka foundation (Nicholls, 2010b) would be considered as powerful stakeholders that 
can have impact on the centrality of competing logics. 
 Sixth, I believe that future research can benefit from identifying other important 
contingent factors for the relationships proposed in this dissertation. For example, extant 
research suggests that a top manager’s own preference should be examined carefully. 
Building on agency theory and optimal contracting theory, Masulis and Reza (2015) 
showed that there is a positive relationship between corporate charitable giving and a 
CEO’s charitable preferences. Future research could investigate whether social 
entrepreneurs’ preference could moderate the relationship between their non-profit 
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APPENDIX A:  Variable operationalization 
Variables Variable name Variable definition/operationalization Variable source 
Dependent 
variables 
The centrality of competing 
logics 
Composite of four 7-point Likert-type items assessing the degree to which 




  Composite of four 7-point Likert-type items assessing the degree to which 
top management discuss about financial/strategic issues (Muller & Kolk, 
2009; Weaver et al., 1999). 
Survey from 
middle-manager 
  Formula for the centrality of competing logics, adopted by Janis- Fadner 
coefficient of imbalance (Deephouse, 1996; Greenhous, Collins, & Shaw, 





 𝑖𝑓 𝑆 > 𝐹; 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐹 = 𝑆; 
(𝑆𝐹 − 𝐹2)
𝐶2
 𝑖𝑓 𝐹 > 𝑆,  
 
where S is the attention to social/beneficiaries issues, F is the attention of 
financial/strategic issues, and C is the total attention. The range of this 
variable is -1 to 1, where -1 equals "attention to all social/beneficiaries 





Ethical Investors in Investor 
Stakeholder 
Calculated as the ratio of internal and external investments without 
financial expectations to the total investments in the social 
enterprises 
Survey from  
Social entrepreneur 
 Reciprocity inCustomer 
Stakeholder 
Calculated by the ratio of customers motivated by reciprocity to the 
total customers in the social enterprises 





 Cross-Sector Workers in  
Employee Stakeholder 
Calculated by the ratio of employees having experience both social 
and commercial sectors to the total employees 







The number of years the social entrepreneurs reported having 
worked in the non-profit sector prior to starting the current social 
enterprise 





Ambivalent interpretation Composite of two 7-point Likert-type items assessing the degree to which 
CEOs evaluate the current trend  (Plambeck & Weber, 2010; Thompson, 
Zanna, & Griffin, 1995; see Appendix B). 
Survey from  
Social entrepreneur 
  A = (D+C)/2 − (D-C) 
, where D is the dominant reaction and C is the conflicting reaction 
 
Survey from  
Social entrepreneur 
 Career Variety Measured by entrepreneur’s (1) years of work experience in for-profit 
organization(s), (2) years of work experience in non-profit organization(s), 
(3) Numbers of industries, (4) Numbers of organizations,  (5) Numbers of 
functions, (6) Age, (7) Career experience (years), (8) Education level 
 
Archival/ 




Study One and 
Two 
Total attention to issues The sum of top management’s attention both to social issues and 
commercial issues (Muller & Kolk, 2009; Weaver et al., 1999; see 
Appendix B). 
Survey from  
middle-manager 
 Prior Performance Measured by eight items, a 7-point Likert scale (Stam & Elfring, 2000; 
Wang & Bansal, 2012) 
Archival/ 
Survey from  
Social entrepreneur 
 Attainment Discrepancy Dichotomous variable of “1” for positive score of (current performance 
expectation – past performance), and “0” otherwise 
 






 Ratio of Debt Measured by Firm’s long-term debt divided by total assets (Barnett & 
Salomon, 2012) 
 
 Industry Seven dummy variables to control for eight industrial categories: (1) Arts 
and Culture, (2) Civil and Human Rights, (3) Economic Development, (4) 
Education, (5) Environment, (6) Health/Healthcare, (7) Public Service, and 
(8) others 
 
 Type Four dummy variables to control for five types of activities: (1) Social 
Service, (2) Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs), (3) Mixture of 
social service and WISEs, (4) Community-based, (5) Others. 
 
 Diversity of Board of 
Directors 
The formula is 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1 , where P is the proportion of board of 
directors with a past experience category i, N is the total number of 
experience categories. In this study, I identified four categories of 
past experience: (1) social sector, (2) commercial sector, (3) both 
social and commercial sectors, and (4) non-experience. 
 






Founder Age Measured by the logarithm of the age  Archival/ 
Survey from  
Social entrepreneur 
 Founder Gender Dummy coded “1” if founder is male, and “0” if not  
 Founder Education Level Measured by 1= high school, 2=bachelor’s degree, 3=master’s 
degree, and 4=doctoral degree. 
 
 Founder’s for-profit 
experience 
The number of years the social entrepreneurs reported having 
worked in the for-profit sector prior to starting the current social 
enterprise 
 





APPENDIX B: Vignette for Ambivalent Interpretation 
[Ambivalent evaluation of Strategic Issues-Case]  
Korean government decided to change the policy on social entrepreneurship from direct 
support to indirect guidance. For example, Korean government has provided financial 
support to all accredited social enterprises for first three years. However, the government 
now will try to enhance market-oriented methods such as linking sales channels, 
increasing government purchasing, and developing capital market for social 
entrepreneurship.  
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
Positive interpretation (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
Our company will benefit from the current trend described above. 
The current trend described above comprises a potential gain for our company. 
Negative interpretation (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
The current trend described above is something negative for our company. 










APPENDIX C: Characteristics of Interviewed Social Enterprises 
Case Principal Activities 
1 A social venture (not accredited by Korean government)  providing the new 
and more sustainable ad-system for internet-based companies 
2 An accredited social enterprise, a catering services hiring disabled people 
3 An accredited social enterprise, a cleansing service firm employing socially 
disadvantageous people 
4 A social venture start-up, preparing the full launching the online/mobile 
gaming company. It provides the games to donate to charity 
5 An accredited social enterprise, making a mobile app for donating to charity.  
6 An accredited social enterprise, developing and providing healing and 
recovery programs for community. 
7 A social venture (not accredited by Korean government, but supported by 
capital city) offering web-based service for social dining networks   
8 An accredited social enterprise, a fair tourism company, which connects 
travelers with local communities as well as provides more sustainable ways of 
tourism 
9 A social venture (not accredited by Korean government) serving a plat-form 
business with companies for fair tourism 
10 An accredited social enterprise, a social work services in nursing homes 
11 An accredited social enterprise, Maintenance, Repair, and Operating (MRO) 
Supply service. It recruits and supports social enterprises as potential suppliers 
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